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 There has been much debate about the United States Supreme Court and the 
importance of selecting the "right" justice to sit on the bench. These debates have resulted in 
several hostile confirmation battles between both parties in the United States. These battles 
attributed to the perception that the Supreme Court is a powerful organization with the power to 
determine what rights the United States citizens may or may not possess. 
This thesis attempts to prove that the Court does not have as much power as the public 
may think. Specifically, it looks at three separate factors that would demonstrate an influential 
Supreme Court. These three factors included the constitutional right to judicial review, the 
concept of judicial supremacy, and the Court's legitimacy. This thesis will show that the Court 
does have judicial review, but does not possess complete supremacy, and struggles to maintain 
legitimacy.   
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On September 17, 1787, the framers signed the United States Constitution. It was ratified 
into law on June 21, 1788, officially creating the United States government. This document has 
been at the center of many debates since. The Supreme Court is viewed as the entity that rules on 
these decisions. The nine Supreme Court Justices are often viewed as the guardians of our 
liberties. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton discussed the role of the Court. He stated that 
they are to be an independent judiciary who, at times, may need to declare acts that are contrary 
to the constitution void.1 When the Constitution was written, many in society were concerned 
with the prospect of a tyrannical government. They were primarily concerned with one branch 
having too much power. During their time under British rule, the judges served at the will of the 
King. For that reason, many were also skeptical about placing certain powers into the hands of 
the judiciary. To address these concerns, Alexander Hamilton reminded people that the judiciary 
would be the "least dangerous branch" (least powerful), as they possessed neither the power of 
the sword nor the power of the purse. Today nearly 233 years after the Constitution was written, 
many believe that the Court has become too powerful. This belief may be partly because of the 
misunderstanding of what the Court does and the power they have. 
This misunderstanding is fueled by politicians and scholars alike. In one article, the 
scholar argued that the Court was the last hope for the left. In her article, she argues that the 
Court must move away from judicial restraint and stop conservative policies.2 She believes that 
the Court can use their judicial review power to stop specific actions when the liberal population 
 
1 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78” May 28, 1788 
2 Caroline Fredrickson, “The Least Dangerous Branch-And the Last Hope of the Left.” Harvard Law & Policy Review, 





may not agree. This idea is known as judicial activism, something that is not limited to the liberal 
side. The idea that the Court should weigh in on the most sensitive issues has become 
commonplace. That is the reason that many presidential candidates raise that as one of their key 
issues. In the 2016 election, there was a vacant seat left by the deceased Antonin Scalia. His seat 
had the potential to tip the scales toward a more liberal makeup of the Court. Then presidential 
nominee Donald Trump campaigned that he intended to put more justices like Antonin Scalia on 
the bench. Many in America feel that it is the job of the Court to solve the most divisive issues. 
In a poll taken in January 2005, the registered voters were asked if a Senator would be justified 
or unjustified if they voted against a fully qualified nominee if they disagreed on their stance on 
salient issues like abortion, gun control, or affirmative action.3 When that poll was taken, 51% 
believed it would be justified to vote against the nominee, while only 46% thought it unjustified.4 
Another poll from the pew research center taken in July of 2018 asked how important the choice 
for the next Supreme Court justices was to them personally. The responses were that 63% felt it 
was very important, and another 20% found it somewhat important.5 These numbers demonstrate 
that the general public may view the Court as an organization with immense power to determine 
the future of our liberties. This idea is even at times, supported by the president. One such 
example comes from a recent social media post from President Donald Trump. He stated, "These 
horrible and politically charged decisions coming out of the Supreme Court are shotgun blasts 
into the face of people that are proud to call themselves Republicans or Conservatives. We need 
more justices, or we will lose our 2nd Amendment and everything else.”6 The above examples 
raise the question, if ordinary citizens and the president believe that the Court has this immense 
 
3 “Supreme Court Poll” Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx 
4 Ibid. 




power, was Alexander Hamilton wrong? Is the Supreme Court still the "least dangerous branch?" 
This question needs an answer because the Courts are viewed as guardians of liberty, and if they 
are becoming too powerful, freedoms could be in jeopardy. Several factors must be assessed to 
determine just how powerful the Court is. The first question that needs an answer is if judicial 
review is Constitutional. The pinnacle of the Court's power is that they can overturn laws that are 
not in line with the Constitution. However, if the power was not authorized, they may not be as 
powerful as some may think. To prove judicial review is constitutional, historical documents 
such as the Constitution itself will be analyzed.  
Furthermore, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers will be analyzed to see what the 
founders and those who opposed the Constitution thought about the judiciary's power. This 
analysis will result in the determination of the constitutionality of the primary power of the 
judiciary. The next question that needs to be addressed about the judiciary's power is if their 
rulings are final. That is, do they possess judicial supremacy, or can other areas of the 
government override them? This question is an integral part of the judiciary if they have become 
increasingly powerful, then it is likely that their decisions are final. If they do not possess the 
final say on all matters, they may not have as much power as society believes. This question is 
analyzed through the application of different Supreme Court cases and how individual presidents 
have responded to Court orders in the past. The final factor in determining the power of the 
Court is how they maintain legitimacy. Most scholars believe that the Court relies heavily on the 
public to keep the power that they have. Much like the first two aspects of the Court, if this part 
of the Court is non-existent or even threatened, then they may not be as powerful as some may 
think. If they have lost legitimacy in the public's eyes, it is less likely that people will be inclined 
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to follow their rulings. To determine the legitimacy of the Court, the Court itself will be 
analyzed. 
Specifically, a breakdown of the polarization of the Court is explored in this Thesis. This 
will include a study into the Court going back to 1970 to determine if a polarization pattern can 
be recognized. Additionally, the nominations process is analyzed to see if the nominations 
process's polarization has impacted the way the Court is made up. Finally, the role of the most 
recent Chief Justice and the Court's relationship with Congress and the president is explored. By 
answering these questions, this paper will prove that the Court is still the least dangerous branch. 
Despite the increased perception of a mighty Court, they still fight to maintain legitimacy, unlike 
the other branches. The remaining chapters will prove this point that the Court cannot act without 
the support of the sword and purse.  The remainder of this paper will explore these concepts in 
depth and look at how the scholars view these different issues. One thing that makes this paper 
stand out is that it incorporates all these themes into one central paper. Most of the scholarly 
work that was found in the process of researching this topic only covers one or two areas. 
However, this paper tends to fit into the scholarly works that supports the idea that the Court 
possess the constitutional right to judicial review, does not have exclusive judicial supremacy, 








Chapter 1: Judicial Review 
On March 4, 1789, the United States officially began governance under the United States 
Constitution. This document provides the three branches of government with their powers and 
describes the branches' responsibilities. This chapter will focus on the judicial branch and the 
powers vested to it by the Constitution. These powers are in Article III of the United States 
Constitution. The specific power that will be looked at is the power of judicial review. Judicial 
review is a power that has allegedly been vested to the courts by the Constitution, which grants 
the Court with the ability to strike down law that is contrary to the Constitution. Looking at the 
power of judicial review, this chapter seeks to answer this question: Is judicial review 
constitutional? Even though the Constitution was written over 200 years ago, there is still debate 
amongst legal minds and scholars about the constitutionality of judicial review. Many scholars 
give credit to the Great Chief Justice John Marshall for the creation of judicial review in the 
courts. This was supposedly accomplished when Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority 
opinion for Marbury v. Madison. Because Chief Justice Marshall is credited with the creation of 
judicial review, many scholars have argued that it is not constitutional, as it is never explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution. This leads to the idea that if it is not expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution, and a member sitting on the Supreme Court created it, it cannot be constitutional. 
Scholars such as John Eastman and Jeremy Waldron have argued that judicial review is 
unnecessary and democratically illegitimate and unconstitutional.7 This chapter seeks to prove 
that judicial review is constitutional and was established before the landmark decision of 
 
7 John Eastman, “Judicial Review of Unenumerated Rights: Does Marbury’s Holding Apply in a Post-Warren Court 
World?” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 28, no. 3 (2005): 713-740 and Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the 




Marbury v. Madison. This chapter will do this by covering pre-constitution case law; Articles VI 
and Article III; and finally, speeches and essays written by the framers during the ratification.  
Literature Review 
The origins of judicial review have been heavily contested amongst scholars. This 
chapter will address this issue. Before the schools of thought are discussed, a brief history of 
judicial review will be provided. The United States developed a government that was to be for 
the people by the people. This was to be achieved through the U.S. Constitution as it outlined 
certain powers of each branch of the government. These branches consisted of the Legislative 
branch, the Executive branch, and the Judicial branch. Each branch was meant to provide certain 
checks to ensure that no one branch would go against the people's will. One of the powers that 
the Judicial branch has is the power of judicial review. Judicial review is the power for the Court 
to render an act of legislation or an executive order unconstitutional. The problem with judicial 
review is that there are still questions about the constitutionality of this power. This begs the 
question, if judicial review is still being debated where exactly did the power come from? To get 
a better understanding, one would first need to look at the Constitution itself. The powers of the 
Court are in Article III of the Constitution, specifically, in section 2 the Constitution discusses 
that the judicial power "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority."8 The reason that debate continues on judicial review is that the Constitution 
never explicitly states that the judiciary shall have judicial review power. Since judicial review is 
not in the Constitution, how did this power come about? And why are there debates about the 
 
8 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2 
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constitutionality of this power? The answers can be found by looking at the different schools of 
thought surrounding this power. This review is intended to explore these schools of thought, 
break down the debates, and determine where the gaps need to be filled.  After reviewing several 
sources, the following schools of thought have been identified. The first school of thought is that 
judicial review, while not explicitly mentioned, was implicitly there and thus is constitutional 
and necessary for the preservation of the republic. The second school of thought is that judicial 
review is not technically constitutional but is accepted practice and essential for the republic's 
protection. The final idea is that judicial review is not constitutional and is not in line with the 
government's democratic principles. In the academic world all three of these schools of thought 
have some degree of following. However, given that judicial review has become a widely 
accepted practice, it can be argued that the first school of thought carries the most weight. This 
chapter will seek to prove this point. 
Judicial review has played a significant role in our government's operation and, as many 
argue, the preservation of our rights. It is mostly agreed upon by scholars that the case that led to 
judicial review of national legislation was Marbury v. Madison. In the article "The Case that 
Made the Court," he gives Marbury v. Madison credit for the creation of judicial review.9 As 
stated above, one of the schools of thought surrounding judicial review is that even though it is 
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, it is implied and thus is constitutional. The article 
The "Fundamental and Natural Law 'Repugnant Review' Origins of Judicial Review" goes into 
detail about the pre-Marbury decisions and the use of judicial review in early English sixteen and 
seventeenth century.10 The article argues that even though the Marbury case solidified the use of 
 
9 Michael Glennon, “The Case That Made the Court,” Wilson Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2003): 20. 
10 Lawrence Perrone, “The Fundamental and Natural Law ‘Repugnant Review’ Origins of Judicial Review,” BYU 
Journal of Public Law 23 no. 1 (2008): 61-81 
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judicial review in our government, the early colonists' actions are what makes the use of judicial 
review an implied constitutional power.11 This argument is furthered in Philip Hamburgers book 
Law and Judicial Duty. In his book he argues that when judicial review came about in America, 
it was not a significant government innovation. Rather, he argues that when the early colonist 
began declaring colonial and state legislative acts unconstitutional, and it continue in the federal 
government, they were simply acting on centuries-old common law practices.12 In other words, 
these authors argue that because judicial review is rooted in the earliest stages of the United 
States, it was evident that the founders had intended for that power to exist. Another article that 
argues that judicial review was a practice that was accepted before the landmark case of Marbury 
v. Madison is the article titled “Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of 
review." In this article, Robert Frankel argues that judicial review was not first applied in the 
Marbury case, but rather in Hylton v. United States. He states that the Supreme Court first 
suggested using judicial review when they decided on the government's constitutionality to 
impose a Carriage tax. Essentially, they agreed that it was the legislature's right to impose the 
indirect tax as it fell into their powers written in the Constitution.13 By doing this, they utilized 
the power of judicial review. The author also believes that the powers are implicit in the 
Constitution and refers to Federalist 78. In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states that it is the 
duty of the Court to "declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”14 
This is where many of the scholars who feel that it is implied get their belief. Another area where 
that creates an understanding for implied judicial review is found in the Anti-Federalist paper 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard university Press, 2008. 
13 Robert Frankel Jr., “Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review,” Journal of 
Supreme Court History 28, no 1. (2003): 1-13. 
14 Federalist 78 
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written by Brutus. These papers are titled Brutus 1 and 11; in Brutus 1, the Anti-Federalist 
simply quotes the judicial power as written in the Constitution. In Brutus 11, the author states 
that "if these powers were to be so vested in the Supreme court, they would be held 
unaccountable to the will of the people and any errors they may commit in their act of judicial 
review would not be corrected by any other power.15  
Another argument that is made about the origins of judicial review is that it was used in 
early society prior to the Constitution but only in the direst situations. This is argued in Sylvia 
Snowiss’ book Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution. In her book, she argues that 
prior to the Marbury v. Madison case in 1803 judicial review was practiced.16 However, she 
argues that it was not used on a regular basis and was only applied when there was a clear 
violation of fundamental law. She further argues that when Chief Justice Marshall made his 
ruling, he altered the way that judicial review was intended to operate and expanded the scope of 
the judicial power. This argument takes the side that judicial review was intended but not in the 
scope that it operates today.  
The origin of judicial review still seems to be a topic of debate. The article "The Origins 
of Judicial Review" discusses the textual evidence that suggests judicial review was the original 
intent of the Constitution. The author establishes this using Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution. The author argues that the verbiage permitting the judiciary with the power of all 
cases arising under the Constitution permits judicial review.17 The author then argues that the 
 
15" Brutus 1 and 11 
16 Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution. (New Haven, Connecticut): Yale University Press, 
1990. 
17 Saikrishna B. Prakash, and John C. Yoo. "The Origins of Judicial Review." The University of Chicago Law Review 
70, no. 3 (2003): 887-982. doi:10.2307/1600662. 
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Supremacy Clause in the Constitution makes the document supreme to all other statutes and, as 
such, requires the Court to declare acts contrary to the Constitution void.18  
Another article worth noting is an article titled "Unleashing the Least Dangerous 
Branch." In this article, the author discusses a debate that is going on amongst conservatives and 
libertarians. On both sides of the discussion, it is accepted that judicial review is necessary for 
preserving the republic; at this point, it is just a debate about how much review is needed. The 
author discusses that judicial review has played an essential role in determining certain rights. 
The author discussed cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, Roe. v. Wade and other matters 
involving civil rights.19 The author accepts that at least to a certain degree had it not been for the 
Court, we may still be in an era of segregation. However, the author then discusses that there are 
libertarian scholars that believe that the Court must also decide on natural rights that are not 
written. In other words, they think that the Court should take on the role of judicial 
engagement.20 One of the most vocal scholars of this mentality is Randy Barnett. In his article 
"In Defense of Constitutional Republicanism," he discusses the lack of court interference that 
results in the government's over-reach.21 However, the author of the "Least Dangerous branch" 
disagrees and believes that the Court should continue to exercise judicial restraint and argues that 
in recent years, the Court has utilized too much judicial review power giving more power to the 
federal government. The argument this author makes is the judicial review is necessary but 
should only be used in moderation.   
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Mark Pulliam, “Unleashing the ‘Least Dangerous’ Branch,” Texas Review of Law & Politics 22, no. 3 (2018): 423-
468 
20 Ibid. 




Another argument that is out there is the idea of utilizing the Court's judicial review 
power to restrain the power of one political party over the other. In the article "The Least 
Dangerous Branch-And the Last Hope of the Left," the author argues that judicial review is not 
only constitutional, but it should also be used by the Democratic party to stop the policy actions 
of the Republican party and President Trump.22 The author argues that for our rights to be 
preserved, the courts must intervene in the party's actions to stop unconstitutional actions. The 
author then states that the courts are already beginning to do this and describes the use of the 
Court to halt executive actions including the travel ban.23 This is similar to the theory of judicial 
engagement suggested by libertarians in the article "In Defense of Constitutional 
Republicanism." Some scholars believe in judicial restraint while other scholars believe in 
judicial engagement, with the difference of understanding, it raises the question: What is the 
intent of judicial review? This gives rise to another school of thought regarding judicial review. 
If judicial review was given to the courts to determine the constitutionality of laws, but each 
branch is supposed to be separate but equal, would this then give the president and Congress the 
right to determine constitutionality as well24 This argument is presented in the article "Judicial 
Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding." This is important because if the Court ruled 
against the travel ban, is it possible for President Trump to determine that he is, in fact, within 
his constitutional rights to pursue the ban and ignore the Supreme Court decision? According to 
the author of "Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding," it is plausible. This was 
also an argument that Thomas Jefferson presented in his letter to Judge Spence Roane. In this 
 
22 Caroline Fredrickson, “The Least Dangerous Branch-And the Last Hope of the Left,” Harvard Law & Policy Review 
12, no. 1 (2018) 121-144 
23 Ibid. 
24 Matthew Stellen, "Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding," University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 17 no. 2 (2014): 479-568.s 
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letter, he advocated for each branch to have the power of Constitutional interpretation. Declaring 
that the Constitution bounds each branch and thus, it is their duty to uphold the Constitution.25 
So far, the schools of thought that have been covered include the idea that judicial review 
is constitutional because it is implied by the founders and necessary to protect the people's rights. 
The next school of thought covered is that it is needed but must be used in moderation. The final 
school of thought covered above is that it is necessary and should be used more.   
The next school of thought that will be covered is that judicial review in its current form 
should not exist, and it is contrary to the original intent of the founders. This line of reasoning 
can be found in the articles titled "The Writ-Of-Erasure Fallacy” and “Whatever the Judges Say 
it Is? The founders and Judicial Review " In these articles, the authors discussed how the power 
of judicial review had become widely accepted as the power for the Court to nullify a law if it is 
unconstitutional.26 The authors assert that this is not the real purpose of the Court, and if judicial 
review is intended, it is only to state an opinion and allow the legislature to make the law fit in 
the confines of the Constitution.27 The authors state that the real power lies in the people's hands, 
and giving the Court such control makes them unequal to the other branches and thus the most 
powerful.28 Another article that discusses judicial power growth beyond the original intent is an 
article written by Gordon Wood. In this article, he explains how the Court was once referred to 
as the least dangerous branch, but over time has seized additional power using judicial review. 
The author asserts that following the case of Marbury v. Madison, the Court has managed to 
 
25 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Judge Spencer Roane” (1819). 
26 Joyce Malcom, “Whatever the Judges Say it is? The founders and Judicial Review” Journal of Law & Politics 26, 






expand its influence and alter the course of American government.29 It would seem that this 
school of thought is that judicial review in a basic form is ok, but it has grown beyond its original 
intent. Another article that follows Professor Woods's line of thinking is the article "The Origins 
of Judicial Review: A Historian's Explanation." In this article, the author discusses how the 
Constitution itself does not grant judicial review power. Instead, it was a by-product of events in 
the eighteenth century that led to judicial review.30 
The above school of thought discusses how judicial review in its current form is too vast; 
however, the next school of thought discusses how judicial review is unnecessary. In the article 
written by John Eastman, he argues that the power of judicial review, even as written by John 
Marshall, was not originally intended to give the Court the final say on the constitutionality of 
laws, but rather to provide them with a say. The author argues that judicial review is not needed 
to maintain our republic and is meant to allow for collaboration amongst the branches of the 
government.31 This thought process is like the one mentioned above, which states that it is up to 
each branch to interpret the Constitution. The difference is that the author argues that judicial 
review is not necessary, while the other author argues that it is in moderation. Another article 
that claims that judicial review is not required to protect rights is written by Jeremy Waldron. 
Here he states judicial review is unnecessary for the protection of rights; it is also democratically 
illegitimate. In his argument, he says that because the governed's consent ultimately gives power, 
the people can determine which rights they have without needing the Court's interference.32 He 
 
29 Gordon S. Wood, “The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshal Court Made More out of Less,” 
Washington and Lee Law Review 56, no. 3 (1999): 787-810. 
30 Charles F. Hobson, “The Origins of Judicial Review: A Historian's Explanation,” Washington and Lee Law Review 
56, no. 3 (1999): https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol56/iss3/4 
31 John Eastman, “Judicial Review of Unenumerated Rights: Does Marbury’s Holding Apply in a Post-Warren Court 
World?”  
32 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. (2006): 1348-1406. 
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goes on further to state that to preserve democratic principles, the people need to make these 
decisions and not rely on a court of unelected individuals to decide on behalf of the people. 
Through court interference, the author argues that it goes against any democratic form of 
government.33 
As noted throughout this literature review, several schools of thought exist as they pertain 
to the act of judicial review. One thing that has consensus is that the Constitution does not 
explicitly state that the courts have been granted the power. Where arguments begin to differ is 
on if the powers are implied. The discussion is further divided on how much authority is allowed 
under the implied power and if the original intent of judicial review has been increased over the 
years, giving the Court more power than it should have been given. On the complete opposite 
side of the argument, others believe that there is no implied power, nor is it constitutionally 
sound. The people who argue this believe that the Court has no authority at all to exercise this 
power. After conducting the review, the gaps that may need additional research revolve mainly 
around the argument about the origins of judicial review. Most scholars have accepted that 
judicial review is a necessary aspect of our republic, but it is still highly debated on the origins of 
judicial review. This question can be addressed by looking at the earlier courts and their use of 
judicial review. 
Understanding the Argument 
Before the constitutionality of judicial review is discussed, two things must first be 
established. For this argument, the first is that the original intent of the framers and original 
understanding of the people is used to interpret the constitutional text. Secondly, the context of 
 
33 Ibid.  
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judicial review in this argument is the ability for the Court to declare that certain aspects of the 
law are not consistent with the Constitution. In other words, for this purpose, judicial review is 
not the same thing as judicial supremacy. That is the idea that the Court has the final say on what 
law is. 
To establish the intent of the framers and understanding of the people, several pre-
constitutional cases will be discussed that demonstrate that judicial review in its purest form was 
not a new concept in the United States. While not all of them involve striking down a law that is 
contrary to the Constitution (in this case often state Constitutions), they do display that the Court 
acknowledged this power. These cases will be presented in sequential order.  
Holmes v. Walton 
 To demonstrate the use of judicial review in a pre-constitutional America, the case of 
Holmes v. Walton will be broken down. This case will show the direct application of judicial 
review as the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down a law as unconstitutional. To establish 
how the Court did this, the facts of the case must be reviewed. On October 8, 1778, the New 
Jersey legislature passed a law to prevent the supply or assistance to enemy forces (British 
Troops) through the action of seizure. Not only did the act allow for seizure, but the person 
carrying the goods was to be brought before a justice of the peace immediately.34 The law further 
stipulates that if the person hauling supplies were found guilty, the person or persons who seized 
the goods would divide it among themselves.35 The jury was made up of six jurors, and if the 
jurors delivered a verdict, it could not be appealed; this is per the law that was passed on 
 





February 11, 1775.36 Taking advantage of the law that allows for seizure, Major Elisha Walton 
seized goods carried by John Holmes and Solomon Ketchum. This case was eventually tried, and 
with a jury of six men, a verdict was brought in favor of Major Elisha Walton. While the suit was 
still pending, the persons on trial had already appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.37 After 
receiving the request, the Court decided to take up the case. The lawyer for the appellants argued 
that the law passed in 1775, allowing a jury of six men was in direct violation of the New Jersey 
Constitution.38 After several months of deliberation, the Supreme Court came back with a verbal 
opinion that, in summary, said: given that the law passed in 1775 was contrary to the 
"Constitution" of New Jersey, the Court would reverse the decision of the lower Court.39 Using 
the power of judicial review, the Court deemed the law unconstitutional and thus not applicable 
in the case of property seizure.40 This case is critical because as the literature review 
demonstrates, several scholars argue that judicial review in the United States can be traced to the 
Marbury v. Madison opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall in 1803. Nevertheless, as the 
dates show, judicial review had already begun to take shape even before the Constitution's 
official draft. 
Rutgers v. Waddington (1784) 
In 1783 New York enacted a piece of legislation known as the Trespass Act, which was 
established to allow patriots to sue those who remained loyal to Britain for damages that resulted 







41 Rutgers v. Waddington (1784) 
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opportunity to sue Benjamin Waddington for rent that she believed was owed to her during the 
time the British occupied her property. The attorney who took on the case on behalf of Benjamin 
Waddington was none other than Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers that believed that the 
judicial review was within the Court's power. In 1784, Alexander Hamilton argued before New 
York City's Mayor court that the Trespass Act of 1783 directly violated the treaty signed by the 
United States in 1783.42 The judge ruled that the Constitution of New York, written in 1777, 
established the understanding of common law and recognized the law of nations.43 What this 
meant was that because the Articles of Confederation had stated that no state may at any time 
abridge the right of the United States to declare or end war, and the United States lawfully 
entered a treaty under the authority of the federal government, the Trespass Act directly violated 
the rights of the federal government. This resulted in the judge stating that Ms. Rutgers was not 
entitled to any payment while the British government occupied her place.44 This case is another 
clear demonstration of the applicable use of judicial review. Though the judge did not directly 
strike the law down, he decided to rule that the law was not consistent with federal law, so it 
would not be enforced.   
Trevett v. Weeden  
 Another case that provides the pre-constitutional application of judicial review is the case 
of Trevett v. Weeden. This case offers a great example that covers a fundamental right to a jury. 
In 1786 the state of Rhode Island passed a legislative act which established a system of paper 





45 Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, Keith E. Whittington, “The Founding Era-Criminal Justice/Juries Lawyers” 
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anyone were to refuse, they would be found guilty without the need for a jury. In this case, John 
Weeden was a salesman of meat, and he only did business in silver and gold. During a 
transaction, he refused the paper currency, and John Trevett brought this before the Court to seek 
the required penalty.46 For his defense, John Weeden hired General James Varnum, a seasoned 
and respected lawyer. To argue this case, General Varnum stated that a right to a jury was a 
fundamental right, and the act that did not require a jury was in conflict with the Rhode Island 
Constitution, and thus the law was void.47 This argument seemed to satisfy the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court as they ultimately ruled that the law was unconstitutional and that a jury was 
required.48 Although an opinion was never officially published, James Varnum himself published 
a lengthy account that discussed both his argument and the decision by the Court.49 This is a 
prime example of judicial review being utilized in a pre-constitutional era.  
Bayard v. Singleton (1787) 
 This next case deals with a dispute over property and what the plaintiff viewed as an 
unlawful seizure.50 This case started when Mr. Cornell, a loyalist to the British government, 
decided to return to Britain on August 19, 1775.51 During his absence, his family remained in the 
United States at the time, still occupied by the British. In 1777, he returned but was refused entry 
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to sign the deed to his property over to his daughter to ensure that she kept the property.53 
However, given the family loyalties to the British, the property was seized as they were 
considered the enemy. After the property was taken, the daughter sued for her right to the 
property in 1787. Her attorney Samuel Johnston argued that the confiscation acts violated the 
Constitution of North Carolina, requiring a jury trial if any property was to be in dispute.54 
Ultimately, the state Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ms. Bayard. They determined that the 
confiscation acts which seized her property as a citizen of the United States was in direct 
violation of the state Constitution and required the case to go before a jury.55 
Putting it all Together 
Although only four cases have been analyzed, a common theme has appeared. The first 
theme is that all these cases involved a dispute with a statute passed by the state government. 
They also had a court of some kind decide that the statue was either not in line with the state 
Constitution or, in one such case, federal law. In one form or another, all these cases had a judge 
issue an opinion that declared an act void or simply refused to enforce the law itself. Each of 
these cases has a uniqueness in the fact that they all occurred in separate states. This provides 
evidence that judicial review was a concept practice in many of the original colonies. Another 
common theme that has been found researching these cases is that scholars and historians cannot 
agree on which of the cases established the precedent that would eventually lead to the power of 
judicial review at the federal level. Although many scholars debate this topic, there has been 
little attention paid to these cases. The belief among most scholars is that judicial review is likely 







would show that they provide proof of judicial review before the famous case in 1803. It is 
essential to review these cases and recognize its significance because it can be used to help settle 
the debate about the constitutionality of judicial review. 
Articles in the Constitution 
So far, this chapter has covered cases that pre-dated the Constitution utilizing judicial 
review. Now, the Constitution itself must be explored to build on the matter of the 
constitutionality of judicial review. The United States Constitution was created because many 
had realized that the United States would not survive under the construct of the Articles of 
Confederation. The Articles provided little power to the federal government and created a federal 
system that faced many challenges in dealing with foreign policy. This led to the founders calling 
for a Constitutional Convention. To understand the powers of the judicial branch, the purpose of 
the Constitution and intent of the founders must be understood. The founders created a system 
that was meant to provide checks and balances that would provide a stable central government 
and check the three branches to ensure that individual rights and liberties were not infringed 
upon. The founders envisioned a system that would be self-regulating and for the people. To 
ensure that the states would not pass any laws that would contradict this federal power, the 
founders wrote into the Constitution, the supremacy clause. This clause is found in Article VI, 
and it states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
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bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.56 
The supremacy clause plays a vital role in the Constitution as it establishes that the Constitution 
is the law of the land, and no law may be passed that violates the Constitution. In this clause, it 
states that this clause shall bound judges in every state. To make a case for judicial review's 
constitutionality, Article III can be examined with Article VI. Article III Section 1 states: 
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.57 
Article III Section 1 shows that the judiciary's power shall be vested in the Supreme Court and in 
inferior courts that are to be stood up by Congress. Article III Section 2 states: “The judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”58  If Article 
VI and Article III are looked at together, a reasonable argument can be made that the founders' 
intent was judicial review. The reasoning for this is that Article VI states that the Constitution is 
the law of the land, and this clause bounds judges from every state. This means that no law may 
be passed that conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution then states that the judiciary's 
power will be vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts that Congress creates. Given 
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that the Constitution states that the judges are bound by the supremacy clause from all states, 
logic dictates that it is up to the judges to ensure that laws do not interfere with the Constitution. 
Logic dictates this because, in Section 2 of Article III, the Court's power extends to all cases of 
Law and Equity. If the Constitution is the law of the land, this would make the Constitution itself 
a law, which means that any case that deals with an act that is contrary to the Constitution falls 
within the judiciary's power. Since it is the responsibility of the Court to provide judgment on 
such cases and interpret the law, this here shows that the power of judicial review is implied in 
the United States Constitution, thus making it constitutional. This power was provided to the 
Court to make sure that the Constitution remained intact as it was designed to provide the checks 
on the government and protect the people's rights. 
Original Intent/Understanding 
Using Article III and Article VI of the Constitution, the argument has been made that 
when read together, the founders created a system that required the judicial branch to exercise 
judicial review. It has been shown that before the creation of the Constitution, many states had a 
judiciary system that utilized this power to strike down laws that were contrary to the state 
Constitution. This was established through the analysis of four pre-constitution cases. Looking at 
these cases, an argument can be created to show that the people of the states that ratified the 
Constitution had a fundamental understanding that judicial review was an implied power of the 
judiciary as outlined in Article III and Article VI.  If it were the original understanding by the 
states that judicial review was an implied power, this would also demonstrate that judicial review 
is an implied constitutional power. To prove that this was an original understanding, a speech 
given by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratification convention will be summarized. 
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Additionally, a speech given by Oliver Ellsworth will be explored. Finally, some of the 
Publius papers written by the federalist and the Brutus papers written by the anti-federalists will 
be analyzed. Both famous writings mention the power of the Court. 
James Wilson Speech 
 During the ratification process, James Wilson delivered a speech to the people of 
Pennsylvania. This was an effort to convince the state to ratify the new Constitution that James 
Wilson and the other delegates had created.  In this speech, he states: 
I say, under this Constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept within its 
prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department. This I hope, sir, to 
explain clearly and satisfactorily. I had occasion, on a former day [November 24], to state 
that the power of the Constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature, acting 
under that Constitution. For it is possible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity, 
may transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, 
notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges—
when they consider its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power 
of the Constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it void.59  
James Wilson's speech to the people of his state clearly shows an understanding of what is within 
the scope of judicial power. The Constitution grants the judiciary power over all cases in law and 
equity. This means that even the laws of the United States legislature fall within that scope. Here, 
James Wilson says that it is the judiciary's responsibility to declare acts unconstitutional if they 
violate anything within the Constitution itself. This demonstrates that when the Constitution was 
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ratified in Pennsylvania, they had an original understanding that the judicial powers, as outlined 
in Article III Section 2 of the Constitution, clearly included the right to judicial review. His 
speech was intended to sell the Constitution to his state. He wanted to make sure his people 
understood that the federal government would not have unlimited legislative power as the non-
partial branch of the judiciary would regulate it. 
Oliver Ellsworth Speech 
 In January of 1788, Oliver Ellsworth delivered a similar speech to the people of 
Connecticut, as James Wilson delivered to Pennsylvania. In his statement, he states: 
This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If the 
general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a 
constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law 
which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national 
judges, who to secure their impartiality are to be made independent, will declare it to be 
void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a 
usurpation upon the general government, the law is void; and upright, independent judges 
will declare it to be so.60 
Like James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth is telling the people of Connecticut that the federal 
government may not act beyond their powers that were provided in the Constitution. He is 
outright and direct in stating that it is up to the judiciary to determine the law's constitutionality. 
This again indicates that the power of the judiciary does grant them the power of judiciary 
review. These are just two examples of speech's that have been delivered to the individual states 
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to get approval for ratification of the Constitution. The ratification process took nearly two years 
before securing enough states to make the Constitution the new form of government. During this 
time, papers written by both federalists and anti-federalists were circulating through New York. 
These papers were intended to make known the content that was within the Constitution. The 
federalists supported this new form of government as they believed that it was paramount to 
establish a strong central government if the nation were to survive. The anti-federalists were 
concerned that a strong central government would extinguish individuals' rights, and they did not 
support the new form of government. Though they had differing opinions on how the 
government was to be implemented, both sides acknowledged that judicial review was within the 
scope of the courts. This will be demonstrated as Federalist no. 78 and Brutus XI are broken 
down. 
Federalist No. 78 
Federalist No. 78 is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton that focuses explicitly on the 
judiciary. In this essay, he touches on the power of the judiciary and what these powers mean. 
This essay is often cited as one of the best arguments for justifying the constitutionality of 
judicial review. Federalist 78 begins by discussing how the judges of the judiciary are to be 
appointed. He then outlines how long they may hold their office and what can cause them to lose 
it.61 As this paper progresses, he begins to discuss how the judiciary would be the least 
dangerous branch as they do not have the power of the purse, nor do they have the power of the 
sword. Here he says that the judiciary will have no means of making effective change but rather 
have the ability to make sound judgments.62 He then discusses how important it is for the 
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judiciary to remain separate from the other branches as this will be the best way to protect the 
liberties of the people.63 Specifically, he states:  
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited 
Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified 
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of 
attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in 
practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be 
to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all 
the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.64 
Here he clarifies that the judiciary must maintain separation and ensure that acts are not contrary 
to the Constitution. As mentioned, the purpose of this form of government was to create checks 
and balances to ensure that people's rights remained intact. It is impossible to enforce a 
Constitution if there is no independent judiciary who knows and understands the law, making 
those interpretations. Here Alexander Hamilton demonstrates that the powers granted to the 
judiciary within the Constitution provided them with the right of judicial review. To summarize, 
he thought it is on the judiciary's shoulders to act as the interpreter of the Constitution. He 
believed that if this did not occur, the legislature would be able to work against the Constitution, 
making the document itself useless. Alexander Hamilton demonstrates the Constitution itself is 
the means of separating the powers required by the judiciary to get involved to protect the rights. 







Council of Revision Debate 
 Not every person in the Convention supported judicial review like Alexander Hamilton. 
In fact, during the Constitutional Convention, many debates took place regarding the role of the 
judiciary and how disputes would be handled regarding legislative acts. One such suggestion for 
how to handle these disputes was known as the Council of Revision. This “Council” would be 
composed of the executive and judiciary who would exercise a “veto” against national 
legislature. Among those who supported it were James Madison and James Wilson. James 
Wilson later supported judicial review, but that was after the Council of Revisions was voted 
down. Those who opposed the “Council” did so worrying that the veto would not require legal or 
constitutional need to use it.65  Another argument against the Council of Revision was made by 
Elbridge Gerry who argued that judicial review would provide a sufficient check against 
encroachment, but if they were to be on the Council they would have to step into judging policy 
before a legitimate objection to the law was made. One argument made in favor of the Council 
was made by James Wilson. He felt that the Council of Revisions was superior because it 
provided a much broader scope for the executive and justices to defend against unjust or 
dangerous laws that may not be completely unconstitutional.66 Despite the debate for or against 
the Council, one thing can be learned from these debates, which is that most framers saw the 
need for some form of judicial participation to place checks on the legislature. Ultimately, the 
proposal was unsuccessful, but did give way to the implied use of judicial review. 
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 Anti-federalists who did not support the increased central powers of the union, wrote the 
Brutus papers. They believed that the Constitution would lead to governmental superiority over 
the states and leave them susceptible to tyranny. In Brutus XI, the author specifically addresses 
the power of the judiciary with some degree of concern. The papers' opening states: "The nature 
and extent of the judicial power of the United States, proposed to be granted by this Constitution, 
claims our particular attention.”67 Brutus XI paper begins immediately addressing that certain 
powers were granted to the judiciary as proposed by the Constitution. Later in the article, the 
author then states that the courts of the law will make decisions upon the Constitution and the 
laws made pursuant thereof.68 This statement indicates that it is already in the realm of the Court 
to make decisions about the Constitution. Though this point in the paper does not explicitly 
mention that this means they possess the power of judicial review, it is building up to this point. 
Later in the essay, the author then discusses the powers of the judiciary. The powers that he 
addresses are the ones granted to the judiciary in Article III Section 2. The author looks at the 
powers and notices that they are separate, with the first one stating that the power will extend to 
all cases of law and equity that arise from the Constitution and the second one extending to the 
laws of the United States. Here, the author begins to argue that because they are separate, they 
must be two distinct types of cases. Here the author conveys that the framers intended to separate 
these different types of cases or else they would not have both been mentioned. Once he makes 
this connection, he then states: "The cases arising under the constitution must include such, as to 
bring into question its meaning, and will require an explanation of the nature and extent of the 
 




powers of the different departments under it.”69 He then concludes that if these cases require 
explanation and interpretation of the meaning, it must mean that it is within the power of the 
Court to provide such answers. This is a significant conclusion because Brutus XI was a paper 
that argued against the increased use of federal power and did not support this form of 
government. Still, even this author saw that by breaking down the Articles in the Constitution, it 
could be concluded that judicial review is necessary for the Constitution to work.  
What it all means 
Throughout this chapter, many documents have been reviewed that argue in favor of 
judicial review's constitutionality. Of these documents, four cases that took place in four separate 
states were discussed. These cases involved the judiciary utilizing judicial review to void a 
statute outright or refuse to enforce it in Court. The purpose of the four cases was to demonstrate 
that judicial review was a common practice in early American history before the writing of the 
Constitution. If this practice was known before the Constitution, it is reasonable to assume that 
the framers intended the power to continue in a federal system. Two articles of the Constitution 
were reviewed, the first being the supremacy clause and the second being the powers and the 
format of the Court. When the powers of the Court are analyzed, it was argued that they have the 
power of judicial review. The reason is that the Constitution granted the judiciary with authority 
over all cases of law and equity, and according to the supremacy clause, the Constitution is the 
supreme law. Knowing these facts, it is reasonable to consider that it is within the power of the 
Court to render judgment on all cases that may contradict the Constitution. Finally, speeches and 
essays were reviewed, all of which indicate that judicial review is an intended power of the 
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judicial as outlined in the Constitution. With this historical evidence, the only conclusion that can 
be drawn is that the judiciary always possessed this power, and it is constitutional even if it is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution itself. The question now is if it is an intended power, 
why was it that it was not recognized as a continuous power until Chief Justice Marshall wrote 
the opinion of Marbury v. Madison? Many scholars believe that the power was not intended to 
be utilized unless the laws directly violated the Constitution. It was not until 1803 that the Court 
faced this problem.   
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine if judicial review was Constitutional. There 
is still an ongoing debate about this topic. Some scholars believe that it is constitutional, and they 
base this off the ruling and interpretation written by Chief Justice Marshall. Other scholars feel 
that judicial review is inherently undemocratic and thus unconstitutional. This chapter's findings 
have concluded that judiciary review is constitutional and was established before the Marbury v. 
Madison decision. This is contrary to what many scholars have argued but does re-affirm the 









Chapter 2: Judicial Supremacy  
In the previous chapter of this thesis, it was argued that the United States Supreme Court 
possessed the power of judicial review. This power allowed the Court to interpret the 
Constitution and its amendments therein and utilize that legal understanding to strike down laws 
or uphold them. Through research, it has been determined that despite the Constitution not 
explicitly stating this power, it is implied as the framers' intent based on historical data and 
speeches provided by the framers. With this determination, the next question that must be 
addressed is: With the Courts possessing the power of judicial review, do they also have the 
power of judicial supremacy? To better understand this question, one must first understand the 
definition of judicial supremacy in this context. For this argument, judicial supremacy is the 
Court possessing ultimate authority on the interpretation of the Constitution and final say on the 
validity of the law under the Constitution. This chapter will show judicial supremacy exists to 
some degree in the United States. In other words, this paper will show that in certain 
circumstances, when the right conditions exist, the Court can and will have the final say on 
matters regarding the Constitution. This chapter will show that the Courts right to judicial 
supremacy depends on what case they are deciding, the president's desire to support that 
decision, and how the citizens react to the decision. The format of this chapter is as follows; it 
will first have a literature review that looks at the different schools of thought surrounding this 
topic. Next, the findings of the research will be presented. Specifically, the evidence will focus 
on cases where many believe judicial supremacy exists. The evidence will look at previous 
presidents and Congress members who have argued in favor of or against judicial supremacy. 




Following the Dred Scott Decision in 1857, a firestorm of debate kicked off, which 
addressed the finality of a Supreme Court decision. This finality in legal jargon is judicial 
supremacy or the idea that the ruling of the Court is final. Abraham Lincoln primarily led this 
debate, though he was a lawyer from Illinois at the time. In his argument, he stated that rulings 
are binding in case-specific issues but questioned the finality on the overarching issue.70 Lincoln 
is not the only one who has questions regarding judicial supremacy. This literature review will 
help establish current schools of thought on judicial supremacy. Specifically, this chapter will 
explore three leading schools of thought. These areas include: Judicial Supremacy does not exist; 
judicial supremacy does exist; and finally, the existence of judicial supremacy is a mixture.  
 As stated in the introduction, there are many schools of thought that surround judicial 
supremacy. Many scholars have looked to research this because there has been ongoing debate 
dating back to our country's earliest times. The first school of thought that will be explored is 
that judicial supremacy does not exist. A well-known scholar that supports this school of thought 
is Richard H. Fallon Jr. He supports this school of thought in his article "Judicial Supremacy, 
Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a Populist Age." This article discusses judicial 
supremacy and argues that we do not live under a system that warrants pure judicial 
supremacy.71 This article argues that we currently live under a hybrid system of judicial 
supremacy, departmentalism, and populist constitutionalism. This argument means that the 
Court's power of judicial supremacy only goes as far as the president, Congress, and the people 
are willing to allow.72 In Richard H. Fallon's thesis, he utilizes examples of current situations and 
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those in the past to help illustrate that we live in a mixed bag society.73  He argues that 
Republicans attempt to nominate justices who will overturn Roe v. Wade. He also argues that 
Democrats may attempt to do the same to overturn decisions they do not agree with, such as 
Citizen United v. Federal Election Commission. He also argues that Abraham Lincoln sought the 
overruling of Dred Scott and Franklin Roosevelt against Lochner v. New York. Though this 
article does acknowledge that under perfect conditions, the Court can have supremacy, it also 
argues that the power will only stretch as far as the different branches and the people allow. The 
next article that argues that judicial supremacy does not exist is the article "Judicial Supremacy 
Revisited." This article explores the legitimacy of judicial supremacy as an actual capability of 
the Court. The author of this article, Mark A. Graber, is one of the country's leading 
constitutional scholars, and he argues that judicial supremacy is overhyped in the modern era. He 
suggests that evidence demonstrates that the Court cannot enjoy full judicial authority.74 Dr. 
Graber claims through his research; he found that constitutional authority is often placed in lower 
courts and the hands of elected officials.75 Especially if they can justify defying a precedent to 
protect other constitutional authorities. Dr. Graber also argues that because the Court has no way 
of knowing all the constitutional decisions that are made, they cannot directly enforce or claim 
full supremacy.76 Essentially, this falls under the same school of thought because it is saying that 
the branches of government and the lower courts and local authorities could ignore the Court 
because the Court has no real way of enforcing the rulings. The final article that argues that 
judicial supremacy does not exist is "Judicial Supremacy Has its Limits." In this article, John 
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Yoo, a constitutional scholar who has clerked with Justice Clarence Thomas, argues that despite 
many believing the rulings of the Court is settled law, it is, in fact, not.77 Mr. Yoo argues this by 
saying that because the Constitution grants powers to each branch, including enforcing and 
upholding the Constitution, each branch has the responsibility of interpretation.78 This means that 
it does not fall entirely on the Court, and therefore they cannot possess full supremacy over their 
rulings. This theory is known as departmentalism.  
The last section covered the first school of thought, which was the idea that judicial 
supremacy did not exist. Though the authors differed slightly in what judicial supremacy was, 
they all agreed that often decisions were left to legislatures, lower level courts, and people. The 
next area that is to be explored is the school of thought that judicial supremacy exists.  
The first article that explores the thought that judicial review exists is the article "In 
Defense of Judicial supremacy." This article sets out to argue that judicial supremacy exists 
because it must exist. In other words, Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional scholar and Dean of 
Berkeley Law, argues that because the members of the federal government have little incentive 
to follow the Constitution, an entity, i.e., the Court must exist to be the arbiter/enforcer of 
constitutional law.79 For this to happen, judicial supremacy must exist. Mr. Chemerinsky is 
arguing that judicial supremacy is a necessary function of our government to ensure that the 
Constitution's rights are protected. He argues this by claiming that the framers knew that the 
sudden fear and feelings of the masses might result in the willingness to give up liberties and 
freedoms. This, in turn, is why the Constitution is so hard to alter and why the Supreme Court 
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must protect it. The next article, "Soft Supremacy," takes a different look at the existence of 
judicial supremacy than the first article. However, they still acknowledge that it is the right of the 
Court. This article takes a fascinating look at the existence of judicial supremacy. It does this by 
addressing the arguments people make about departmentalism and popular constitutionalism. 
Corinna Lain, constitutional scholar and Associate Dean of Faculty Development at Richmond 
school of law does this when she restates the arguments. Specifically, she restates the argument 
that departmentalist make: the elected officials have an equal say in the interpretation of the 
Constitution.80 She also restates the argument that popular constitutionalists make: the people 
should have a say in these big decisions.81 By restating this argument, Corinna Lain argues that 
though the Court enjoys the final say on what is constitutional, it is the people and the elected 
officials that help mold the Court to make these decisions. In other words, Corinna Lain argues 
that because the president nominates the justices and the Senate confirms them, the rulings of the 
Court will almost always be in line with the will of the people. In other words, she argues that 
judicial supremacy exists because the will of the people is upheld in the rulings based on the way 
the Court is nominated. This concept is known as Soft Supremacy. Ms. Lain further proves this 
point using the 2016 election. The right for the president to nominate justices was one of the key 
points that was brought up during the 2016 election.82 Each side argued that it was going to be 
vital because it would determine the Court's balance. This shows that the will of the people was 
at the forefront of the conversation when discussing the Court. The final article, "The Problem 
with Judicial Supremacy," written by Dr. Matthew J. Franck, acknowledges the existence of 
judicial supremacy but argues against the need for it. This article uses the case of Obergefell v. 
 






Hodges, which constitutionalized same-sex marriage as the basis for his argument. In his article, 
Dr. Franck categorized judicial supremacy into three categories. The first was judicial supremacy 
of imperial power, which means that the Court is insulated from politics and thus is best suited to 
use the constitutional generalities to generate a legal argument.83 The second is judicial 
supremacy of textual breadth, which means the Court can interpret any textual provisions of the 
Constitution.84 The third is judicial supremacy of authoritative depth, which is the most 
understood definition. This definition is that the law is what the Court says it is. In other words, 
the Court has the final say.85 Ultimately, regardless of the three decisions, Dr. Franck argues that 
judicial supremacy exists, but it has become a mechanism for political activism.  
The final school of thought that will be explored in this literature review is the thought 
that judicial supremacy exists but in a mixed degree. The first article to explore is "Why 
Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy." The author, Neal E. Devins, constitutional 
scholar and Law Professor at William & Mary Law School argues that judicial supremacy can 
exist in the United States because the legislative branch does not challenge it. He argues that 
often Congress is not worried about the legal interpretation of things and gives very little thought 
into the constitutionality of the laws they make.86 Mr. Devins also argues that Congress lacks the 
will and desire to fight the Courts.87 While on the other hand, by the president's right to execute 
laws, they have the power to ignore the Court. He suggests that judicial supremacy only exists 
when one of the other two branches is not willing to fight the Court. Ultimately, he argues that 
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judicial supremacy may exist only when the branches acknowledge or fail to fight against its 
existence. The next article has similar thoughts, but it looks at the polarization of politics as the 
cause for fading judicial supremacy. This article is titled "Judicial Supremacy and the Structure 
of Partisan Conflict." The article goes into detail about two different frameworks of 
constitutional power. These two frameworks are grand constitutional theory and regime power 
theory.88 Grand theory is the thought that the Court acts outside of the people, while the Regime 
theory believes that it is through political frameworks that the Court makes decisions. 
Regardless, Dr. Graber argues that both frameworks see judicial supremacy as the power of the 
Court.89 However, he also argues that in the modern era of the Court and the vast polarization of 
the country, the Court is often found advocating on both sides of the political spectrum and will 
often overrule their rulings. Thus, he argues that judicial supremacy may not be as fully intact as 
Courts of the past.90  
 After extensive research and looking at the different schools of thought, additional 
research must be done to determine the scope of judicial supremacy. Specifically, additional 
research needs to be placed in the Constitution itself. Most of these articles focused on an already 
existing judicial supremacy (or lack thereof), and not so much on the document that would grant 
the power. Documents written by the framers could also shed some light on the issue of judicial 
supremacy. These documents could provide the original intent of the framers when creating the 
different branches of government. Finally, some former Supreme Court cases would need to be 
studied to demonstrate how often the Court truly enjoyed supremacy. Though these scholars 
 







provided some degree of insight into some of the areas such as cases, they were not explored 
deeply to prove the existence or lack of existence for judicial supremacy. One thing that can be 
guaranteed is if judicial supremacy did not have some merit, it would not be a topic of discussion 
today. With that said, this thesis does not embrace or explore the idea that judicial supremacy is 
entirely non-existent. To determine the extent of judicial supremacy, additional research will be 
de done. Specifically, this research will investigate case law that addresses judicial supremacy. 
Additional analysis of the Constitution will be done, and it will be combined with the 
understanding of constitutional scholars. Finally, historical documents written by the framers 
will also be assessed. This chapter will fill in the gaps of previous research regarding judicial 
supremacy. 
Presentation of Results/Analysis 
Historical Documents 
The United States Constitution  
Like any other power possessed by those in the United States government, the first place 
to find its origin is in the Constitution of the United States. This document is the basis for all 
ceded powers to the federal government. For this topic, the area that is covered is Article III of 
the United States Constitution. In this article, the power of the judicial branch is mapped out. As 
a reminder, the question that is being addressed is if the Supreme Court has the power of judicial 
supremacy. Naturally, the first place to see if this power is ceded to the Court is in the 
Constitution itself.  
In Article III Section 1, the Constitution states that "judicial power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress from time to 
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time ordain and establish.".”91 This first section establishes that judicial power is granted but it 
does not specify to what degree. It is in the second section that this becomes clearer, in which the 
Constitution says that “judicial power will extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution.”92 In other words, it is saying that all judicial power is vested in the Supreme 
Court. This vested power is for the Court to deal with all cases dealing with matters of law that 
may arise under the Constitution itself. This clearly shows that the Supreme Court has the 
authority to hear cases that deal with matters of the law, especially those that deal with matters of 
the Constitution. This interpretation was shared by Chief Justice John Marshall, who made a 
similar argument when hearing Marbury v. Madison, the case most famous for furthering judicial 
review's power.93 This interpretation was also one that was accepted by both the Federalist and 
Anti-Federalist during the ratification of the Constitution. In Brutus 1 and Brutus 11, written 
between October 1787 and January 1788, the Anti-Federalist argue that the Constitution provides 
too much power to the Supreme Court because they have the authority of all cases of law.94 
Specifically, those that deal with the interpretation of the Constitution. In Brutus 11, the writer 
goes as far as to suggest that the Court will not be held accountable for its actions and will have 
the power to change the law as they see fit.95 These early interpretations provide insight into the 
known power of the Court. However, does this mean that the Court possesses ultimate authority? 
It does not clearly state that the Supreme Court has supremacy over the cases; rather, it is vested 
in the Court. So, the argument cannot be made looking strictly at this section. However, there can 
be an argument made when this article is read in conjunction with Article VI Section 2. This 
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particular area of the Constitution establishes that the Constitution is to be the supreme law of the 
land.96 What this means is that one could reasonably think that if judicial power is vested in the 
Supreme Court and judicial power extends to all cases dealing with laws under the Constitution, 
that the Courts possess judicial supremacy. This argument is made because if the Constitution is 
a law and the Court has the power to hear cases dealing with law and the Constitution is the 
supreme law, then the decisions that the Court makes regarding the Constitution are supreme. 
However, this argument can also be refuted based on other articles written in the Constitution. 
For example, Article I Section 8 of the Constitution states that Congress has the power to make 
laws to ensure proper execution of powers outlined in the Constitution.97 Furthermore, in Article 
II Section 3, it discusses that the president has the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”98 This demonstrates that each branch has some responsibility in executing 
the powers of the Constitution. This argument is referred to as departmentalism and was 
supported heavily by President Thomas Jefferson. Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts regarding 
departmentalism are covered later in this chapter. Evidence has provided a very murky picture of 
judicial supremacy; on the one hand, it appears that based on Article III and Article VI, the 
Supreme Court may possess judicial supremacy. On the other hand, when the powers of the other 
two branches are considered, everyone may have a hand in determining the constitutionality of a 
law. The next step is to look at some written papers of the framers. 
Federalist 78 
 As it has been demonstrated in the last section of this chapter, there is no way to 
definitively prove that judicial supremacy is a legitimate power by strictly examining the 
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Constitution. Because of this, the next step is to look at the intent of the framers during the time 
that the Constitution was written. The best way to do this is to examine some of the framers' 
writings at the time. The first paper that will be examined is Federalist 78. This paper is an essay 
that was written when the Constitution was going through the ratification process. In this paper, 
Alexander Hamilton directly addresses the Court's role in this new form of government. In 
Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states in not so uncertain terms that the Supreme Court is the 
least dangerous branch of the United States.99 This argument is made because he claims that the 
Court possesses neither the power of the purse nor the power of the sword. What Hamilton is 
saying here is that the Court cannot become dangerous because they do not have the power to 
enforce their judgment nor supply funding to enforce the rule. This falls on the legislative and 
executive branches. This would indicate that the Court cannot possess judicial supremacy 
because they do not have the power to enforce their judgment. However, like the Constitution, 
there is another section in this paper that indicates that they may have some degree of judicial 
supremacy. Specifically, this paper asserts that the "interpretation of the laws is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts."100 It furthers states that the Constitution must be regarded as 
fundamental law, and therefore it belongs strictly to the Court to ascertain its meaning.101 Here 
Hamilton seems to argue that it is the sole responsibility of the Court to interpret and pass down 
a judgment of the Constitution. This meaning fits perfectly within the definition of judicial 
supremacy. Unfortunately, this still does not provide enough evidence to suggest that the Court 
possesses complete judicial supremacy. The reason is that the paper shows that the Court cannot 
enforce its judgment but instead relies on the power of the president. Another reason is that even 
 





further down in the paper, Hamilton discusses that neither the Court nor the Legislative branch 
possesses higher authority than the other, but rather the ultimate authority is to the people of the 
nation. This means that the people will ultimately possess the authority and not those of the 
different branches. 
Federalist 81 
 Much like Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton addresses the power of the Court in 
Federalist 81. In Federalist 81, Alexander Hamilton quotes directly from the then-proposed 
Constitution, stating “that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court.”102 He then 
states that there needs to be “one court of supreme and final jurisdiction.”103 Here, Hamilton is 
directly saying that the Court will possess a final say on matters of law under the Constitution. 
However, like Federalist 78, he offers an exception to this, stating that this final jurisdiction 
applies only to that case and that the legislative branch may make a law with new rules. Here it 
seems that Hamilton acknowledges the idea of a case by case understanding. This is a similar 
understanding that President Lincoln had with the Dred Scott Case. Regardless, it seems that by 
looking at the different documents, there is a common theme. This theme is that judicial 
supremacy may have a place in the Court, but it does not seem to be as finite as some may 
believe. To this point, the Constitution of the United States and a few Federalist papers have 
been analyzed. In these documents, one of the biggest influences of judicial supremacy rests in 
the hands of the president. The reason is that the president has the power and duty to execute all 
laws under the Constitution. This includes the decisions of the Supreme Court. To determine if 
 




judicial supremacy is a power vested in the Supreme Court, it is necessary to look at how 
different presidents have handled Supreme Court decisions.   
Historical Document Analysis 
There have been many different pieces of evidence presented so far. The first area of 
evidence that has been addressed includes several different historical documents. The first 
document covered was the United States Constitution. This document is the very document that 
provides the powers to the United States government officials. After looking at the evidence, it 
can be clear that the Supreme Court should enjoy a certain degree of supremacy. In other words, 
they are the foremost authority on law and should have some degree of say in what law is. 
Despite them being the primary authority on the law, it is through the power of Congress that the 
Court has its budget to function. It is also through the power of Congress that the makeup of the 
Court is determined. In other words, Congress can dictate how many justices sit on the Court. 
This gives Congress some degree of power in the judicial process. Furthermore, Congress also 
can determine who sits on the bench through the Senate's constitutional responsibility to advise 
and consent to a nomination. These actions would give Congress some degree of power to 
undermine pure judicial supremacy. Because the language of the Constitution grants each branch 
some degree of responsibility in constitutional matters, it is hard to justify a pure form of judicial 
supremacy. The next historical document that helped provide insight into judicial supremacy was 
the Federalist papers. In these papers, Alexander Hamilton seemed to argue toward a hybrid 
system that granted the Supreme Court supremacy but also stated that the other branches had a 
role. Together, these historical documents support the argument that judicial supremacy does not 






 During the change of power from President Adams to Thomas Jefferson, there arose an 
issue that would go down in history as one of the most critical aspects of our current government. 
This issue is referring to the infamous case of Marbury v. Madison. This case came about 
because, during the last hours of President Adams's presidency, he attempted to stack the courts 
with as many Federalist sympathizers as possible. However, in one such commission, the papers 
were not properly delivered. As such, it was argued that the commission was not valid. This 
ultimately ended up in the Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Marshall published his opinion 
that the person who received the commission to the judgeship was entitled to his commission 
even though the commission had not been adequately delivered. However, knowing that 
President Jefferson would likely ignore the ruling, Chief Justice Marshall also argued that under 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court did not possess authority to hear the case. The reason is 
because they did not have original authority over the case, and it should have gone to a smaller 
court first. Doing this, he struck down the Judicial Act of 1789 stating that it was not in line with 
the Constitution. The attitude that Thomas Jefferson took was that he believed that each branch 
had some degree of say in what was meant to be constitutional. Because he intended to ignore 
the ruling if Chief Justice Marshall ruled against him, it demonstrates that the Court may not 
possess ultimate supremacy. In fact, Chief Justice Marshall’s actions of voiding a law to avoid 
being ignored by the president also show this. Thomas Jefferson’s justification for potentially 
ignoring the court is found in a letter he wrote several years later. In this letter he stated that all 
three “departments has equally had the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the 
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Constitution, without any regard to what the others may have decided for themselves.”104 In 
other words, Thomas Jefferson, the President of the United States, said that he would not follow 
the Supreme Court ruling as he believed the Constitution provided each branch with separate 
powers to provide checks. Thus, each branch has a responsibility to interpret the Constitution. 
This is a prime example of how a sitting president can overrule the Court. This also demonstrates 
to the degree that the Court does not possess total and complete judicial supremacy.  
Andrew Jackson 
 Another well-known person in American history is President Andrew Jackson. He also 
addressed the issue of judicial supremacy and questioned its standing as constitutional. This 
questioning came when he vetoed a request to renew the Second National Banks charter. This 
veto is essential because, in 1819, under the case McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
ruled that Congress had the power to establish this bank as it fell under the powers to regulate 
interstate commerce. When he vetoed the charter, many felt that he acted against the will of the 
Court as they decided it was within the power of Congress to establish this bank. After vetoing 
the request, he argued that the Court is not always the final arbiter of the Constitution. Explicitly, 
he stated,  
It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and the president to 
decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them 
for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before 
them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over 
 




Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point, the 
president is independent of both.105 
President Jackson makes it clear that his action is defensible because he believes that it is the 
prerogative of the president under the powers granted to the office to determine that his action 
was constitutional. As this demonstrates, there have been at least two presidents who felt that the 
powers to interpret the Constitution falls within the duty of each branch.  
Abraham Lincoln 
The first two presidents demonstrate an example of departmentalism. This next president 
demonstrates a hybrid understanding: the Court has supremacy in each case but not on the 
overarching issue. The person that argued this was President Lincoln while he was still serving 
as a lawyer in Illinois. He argued that though the Court possesses the power of supremacy, it is 
only specific to that case and not all cases arising under law.106 This argument was made 
regarding Dred Scott v. Samford. It was the opinion of Abraham Lincoln that this case did not 
and should not establish precedent for all other matters affecting the citizenship of African 
Americans.  
Presidential Opinion Analysis 
As the section above demonstrates, historical documents are not the only thing that 
provides evidence to support the argument of hybrid judicial supremacy. The actions of a few 
notable presidents also supports the argument. Going back to early times in American history, a 
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few notable presidents have resisted the rulings of the Court. This resistance came in the form of 
departmentalism, which is the idea that all three branches have a responsibility to determine what 
was constitutional. The first president who argued this was Thomas Jefferson. He believed that it 
was the responsibility of each branch as a representative of the people to act in the best interest 
of the people and determine what was constitutional. This, of course, resulted in him threatening 
to disobey the Court. This provides a great example of a hybrid system that only extends 
supremacy to the Court if they have the support of the other branches. This hybrid system is seen 
in the other examples of President Lincoln and Jackson, whom both argued for departmentalism 
and often ignored the ruling of the Courts.  
Supreme Court Cases 
So far, after examining many historical documents and the opinions of several famous 
presidents, it has been challenging to establish pure judicial supremacy. To this point, what has 
been found is that the Court may possess a certain degree of supremacy with different measures 
in place for Congress or the president to overrule the Court. The next step in this process is to 
examine different cases that help establish a basis for supremacy.  
Marbury v. Madison 
In the case of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall published an opinion that the 
Supreme Court must determine what law is. In other words, the Court must state if a law is 
constitutional as the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Many may see this as an 
argument for judicial supremacy, making the argument that the Constitution is supreme, and thus 
the Court has the final say of law. However, as shown above, the Constitution still grants the 
other branches with specific powers to help frame the law within the Constitution. This shows 
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that the Court, while the primary authority on the Constitution, does not have ultimate authority. 
This was demonstrated when Thomas Jefferson threatened to ignore the opinion of Chief Justice 
Marshall.  
Cooper v. Aaron 
 There seems to be a misunderstanding of judicial review and judicial supremacy. Many 
scholars have concluded that because of judicial review, the Court must possess judicial 
supremacy for legitimacy. However, it was not until the case of Cooper v. Aaron that judicial 
supremacy was linked in such a manner. In this case, Arkansas sought to delay the ruling of 
Brown v. Board of Education through the amendment of their state Constitution, which opposed 
desegregation.107 This attempt to delay the ruling resulted in this case ending up in the Supreme 
Court. When this case was heard the opinion was unanimous and stated the following: 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme Law of the Land." In 
1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the 
Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the 
notable case of Marbury v. Madison that "It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that 
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of 
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the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States "any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."108 
What this opinion is attempting to do is establish the idea that because the Court must interpret 
the Constitution, and the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the Courts have supreme 
authority over all matters of law. It is this case that makes the most compelling argument toward 
judicial supremacy. This case was able to accomplish supremacy as it pertained to the original 
Brown v. Board of Education. However, it does not provide enough backing to support a full 
definition of judicial supremacy. Instead, it was the basis for the modern understanding of 
judicial supremacy.  
Roe v. Wade 
 One could argue that if judicial supremacy were legitimate, it would cease all actions to 
pass laws that would undermine the Court's ruling. However, in the case of abortion, several 
laws have been passed following the landmark decision. An important thing to remember is that 
though laws have passed, many have been challenged in the Supreme Court and have been struck 
down or altered to fit specific Court criteria. Roe v. Wade was a decision that essentially 
"constitutionalized" the right to abortion using the justification of the right to privacy, which the 
Court said could be found in the 14th amendment.109 However, despite the Supreme Court 
ruling, many states have passed laws that look to limit or restrict access. Some have even 
succeeded in creating more significant limitations, which resulted in the viability rule. Which 
moved from allowing most second-term abortions to limiting it to fetal viability, which has 
become more restrictive as science has progressed. This is not the only time that the law was 
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challenged. Recently, especially in 2019, several states have passed laws that highly restricted or 
outright banned abortions. This was a result of the balance of the Court shifting following the 
successful nomination and appointments of Justice Kavanagh and Justice Gorsuch. Many of 
these laws were known as "heartbeat" laws that effectively banned abortion after the detection of 
a fetal heart rate.110 Though these laws have not gone into effect because of lower court battles, 
many legal experts think that this could unravel the very decision of Roe v. Wade. In this very 
complex and decades-long legal struggle, there seems to be some disagreement among state and 
federal government officials about the legitimacy of judicial supremacy.  
Supreme Court Cases Analysis 
 Some analysis has already been done in the above paragraph addressing these 
cases. The three cases used as evidence in this chapter were Marbury v. Madison, Cooper v. 
Aaron, and Roe v. Wade. In the first two cases, they established or codified known powers of the 
Court into law through case precedent. What this means is that these cases were known to make 
judicial review entirely accepted. This was done in Marbury v. Madison. The second case was 
thought to have legitimatized judicial supremacy because the opinion was able to link Marbury 
v. Madison and Article VI of the United States Constitution to the Supreme Court. As argued in 
the historical documents section, when one looks at Article III and Article VI of the Constitution, 
it may be reasonable to think that the Court possesses supremacy. This was the argument made 
in Cooper v. Aaron. Unfortunately, like history has shown, to possess supremacy, the Court 
needs to enjoy the support of the president and the legislative body. The last case of Roe v. Wade 
is a primary example of this as it does not have the full support of the people, the president, or 
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the legislative body. As a result, there have been numerous challenges to this precedent, which 
has resulted in the original opinion being altered and may one day result in total override. 
Ultimately, the purpose behind this is to demonstrate that without the power of the purse and the 
power of the sword, the power of the Supreme Court is limited.  
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, evidence has been presented to support the idea that pure 
judicial supremacy does not exist. This was done through the analysis of several historical 
documents to include the Constitution. Comments and actions of former presidents were also 
analyzed. Finally, some Court cases were broken down, which demonstrated that some 
challenges are still occurring today despite the rulings. This process has proved that the United 
States Constitution, which provides checks and balances, has done just that. This means that 
because the Court relies on the other branches to enjoy supremacy, it does not possess pure 
supremacy. Instead, it is a hybrid system that allows the Court to be the final arbiter when the 









Chapter 3: Court Legitimacy 
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 reminds critics that the judicial branch will be 
the least dangerous branch because it has neither the power of the sword nor the purse. This 
chapter focuses on addressing this issue to determine if the Court is still the least powerful. In 
this chapter, this idea will be explored as it addresses the idea of legitimacy. Any powerful 
government organization must be viewed as legitimate.  
In this history of the United States, on several occasions, the United States Supreme 
Court's legitimacy has been called into question. One example is when the Supreme Court was 
inserted into the 2000 Presidential election. In this ruling, the Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 
margin in favor of President Bush. Essentially, the Court at that time had their legitimacy called 
into question because many argued that the Supreme Court's conservative body had stolen the 
election from someone who won the popular vote. The Court also faced a legitimacy question 
when the Court had to rule on the newly signed Obamacare law. Now with President Trump in 
office, some reporters and scholars are calling the Court illegitimate. The reason is that these 
critics state that because President Trump did not win the popular vote and was able to nominate 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, his nomination was illegitimate.111 This assertion goes further to state that 
his illegitimate nominations skewed the Court toward conservativism, which was not in line with 
the popular majority.112 In one New York Times article, the author Michael Tomasky argues that 
President Trump's nominee could not be the will of the people because he was nominated by a 
president who did not win the popular vote and was narrowly confirmed by a Senate that had 
 





fewer votes than those who voted against the nomination. The author further argues that 
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito are also in question because though they were nominated by 
presidents who won the popular vote, their Senator support still did not have more votes than 
those who voted against them.113 Looking at these assertions, it is crucial to analyze the Court 
and determine if it is losing legitimacy.  
This chapter will take an extensive look into the legitimacy of the Court and answer the 
following question: Is the Supreme Court losing legitimacy? The best way to address this 
question will be to explore the different schools of thought on how the Court maintains 
legitimacy. To accomplish this, the schools of thought will break down into the following 
categories: Policy disagreements impact legitimacy; the Positivity Theory can explain the 
legitimacy of the Court, and Polarization of the Court impacts legitimacy. This is completed in 
the literature review section. Following the literature review, this study will focus on the school 
of thought about the Court's polarization, impacting legitimacy. Specifically, this chapter will 
argue that the Court still maintains legitimacy at this time because it has not fallen too deep into 
polarization. This will be accomplished through several sections. The first section will look at the 
confirmation process of Supreme Court Justices. This section will demonstrate that there is an 
increasing polarization of the confirmation process and a decrease in supermajorities in Senate 
confirmations. The second section will look at the raw data regarding the Supreme Court rulings. 
Specifically, it will look at a breakdown of the Court from the period of 1970-1993 and 1994-
2017. The year groups are broken up like this to demonstrate how America began to see a shift 
toward hyperpolarization. Following this, a brief look into the role of the Chief Justice in 





Court with Congress and the president. This relationship should provide some insights into if the 
Court is, in fact, polarized or if it maintains a steady relationship with the different branches of 
government.  
Literature Review 
 In Justice Stephen Breyer's book Making our Democracy Work, he states: “The Court has 
a special responsibility to ensure that the Constitution works in practice.”114 He goes on to argue 
that civic values play a critical role in maintaining public confidence in the Court. However, he 
does not stop there; he understands that civic values are important, but he also understands that 
the Court must “help maintain public acceptance of its own legitimacy.”115 Here, he states that 
though part of the legitimacy of the Court must be passed on through civics, the Court's actions 
impact their legitimacy. The purpose of this review is to explore the different schools of thought 
on how the Court's legitimacy can be impacted. The first school of thought is the idea that policy 
disagreements between citizens and the Court impact legitimacy.  
 In an article written by Alex Badas, he states that policy disagreement has an impact on 
the legitimacy of the Court.116 In his paper, he argues against the traditional legitimacy theory 
that states that policy incongruence has little impact on legitimacy. His theory states that FDR's 
court-packing plan shows a clear relationship between policy incongruence and a decreased 
legitimacy of the Court.117 He believes that during the time the FDR attempted to stack the 
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Court, his New Deal proposals had a lot of support from the general population.118 In his 
research, he found that despite the Court-packing plan failing, those who supported the New 
Deal supported the plan. This plan would have weakened the Supreme Court and decreased its 
perceived legitimacy. This would have happened because it would have been a clear 
demonstration to the people that if the president does not like the rulings of the Court, he can 
simply change the makeup of the Court itself. His study demonstrates that there could be a 
correlation between policy disagreement and a decrease of legitimacy. The problem with his 
study is that it is based on policy disagreement and the actions of a president to attempt to 
delegitimize the Court. If the purpose of this study is to look at the legitimacy of the Court today, 
similar measures would need to be applied. The next study also looks at a policy disagreement 
but looks at it from the perspective of contemporary issues regarding different social groups.  
 In a study written by Michael Zillis, he argues that citizens assess the judicial institution 
based on how they support the various social groups. His paper argues that citizens may view the 
Court's rulings in a negative light if they lean too far toward one of the minority groups who are 
at certain periods viewed in a negative light.119 Specifically, he discusses how people may not be 
as readily willing to accept the rulings of the Court if they rule in favor of illegal immigrants or 
LGBTQ rights.120 His argument asserts that people who have a policy disagreement with these 
rulings will not recognize the legitimacy of the rulings.121 One example of this is when a county 
clerk for Rowan County refused to issue a marriage license to the same-sex couple after the 
Court had provided constitutional protections for same-sex couples to marry. Though this was 
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the action of an individual, his theory asserts that because of groupthink, those who may have 
policy disagreements against certain groups may work together and undermine the legitimacy of 
the Court.122  
 The first school of thought looked at the impact that policy disagreement can have on 
legitimacy. The first article analyzed FDR's New Deal and his Court-packing plan, and the 
second article looked at the impact the Court's rulings on minority groups had on legitimacy. 
Both articles do a good job proving their hypothesis; however, neither has demonstrated 
overwhelming proof that it could impact the legitimacy of the Court. The next school of thought 
about the legitimacy of the Court is known as the Positivity Theory. The first article that 
discusses Positivity Theory is written by James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira. This article 
explores the institutional loyalty that the Court may have based on what is known as Positivity 
Bias. This bias is the idea that judicial symbols such as robes and the Court itself demonstrate 
that the members of the Court are not a mere political institution but rather one that is one of law 
and order. In this article, the authors demonstrate that despite many not agreeing with the 
confirmation of Justice Alito, they looked passed the idea of ideology, policy, and partisanship 
and still viewed the Court and Justice Alito in high regard. This perception was a result of what 
the authors call institutional loyalty and positivity bias.123  
 Another article supporting the Positivity Theory idea is written by James L. Gibson, 
Milton Lodge, and Benjamin Woodson. This article argues that the symbols such as the robe, the 
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gavel, and the extravagant court building all play into the perception of the Court.124 They argue 
this by stating that these symbols subconsciously strengthen the link between institutional 
support and the willingness to accept unpopular rulings. It severs the link between 
disappointment with rulings and willingness to challenge the ruling.125 Essentially, in both 
articles, the authors argue that the appearance of the Justices impacts the way that the general 
population views them. Because the Court is seen to be above politics, they maintain legitimacy 
as the guardians of liberty.  
 The final school of thought is that the polarization of the Supreme Court can undercut its 
legitimacy. The article "Reconsidering Positivity Theory: What Roles do Politicization, 
Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy?" 
combines the different schools of thought of policy disagreement and Positivity Theory into an 
overarching concept of polarization of the Court. In this article, James L. Gibson and Michael 
Nelson argue that politicization can have a significant impact on the legitimacy of the Court. It 
will impact the general population, realist, and legalist. If the Court appears politicized, they are 
viewed negatively by a large portion of the population, depending on the political balance.  
This theory seems to provide the most insight into the current dynamic that is occurring 
with the Court. Specifically, it best addresses the critiques that have been placed on the Court by 
the liberal media and liberal politicians alike. It also addresses the concerns that many presidents 
have debated about during their campaigns. It has become an essential issue in elections as many 
presidents campaign on the idea of placing a judge that falls within a specific ideological line on 
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the bench. For this reason, this is the theory used moving forward with the study about Court 
legitimacy. 
To determine if the Court has become polarized, data was gathered from the Supreme 
Court database for two-year groups. These year groups include the cases from 1970-1993 and the 
cases from 1994-2017. The primary focus of this research was to look at cases from 1994-2017; 
this decision was based on a study conducted by Pew Research, which found that in 1994, 
Senators and Congressman began noticeably moving ideologically further right or left on the 
political spectrum.126 The 1970-1993 year group acts as the control group to compare to the 
1994-2017 year group. The information gathered for these year groups focused on the number of 
cases heard with filtered results to remove cases that could not be categorized politically. It also 
included the justices that heard the cases and their associated Martin-Quinn score. The Martin-
Quinn scores measure the justices on an ideological continuum.127 Other information gathered 
includes each justices voting percentages per year, the percentage of liberal and conservative 
majority opinions; the percentage of unanimous decisions per year; and the percentage of 1-vote 
margin decisions per year. Not only has this information been used to help address the question 
about polarization in the judiciary, but research was also conducted on the nomination and 
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.  
Supreme Court Nominations 
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 Many presidents going back to the early 19th century have used political ideology as a 
factor for nominating federal judges.128 However, since 1994, it seems that ideology has become 
the primary measure of nominations to the Supreme Court.129 This has created an impact on the 
confirmation process. Before 1994, most of the justices were confirmed by supermajorities. 
There are a few outliers, one being Justice Clarence Thomas, who was appointed in 1991. This 
outlier is partially a result of an accusation that came to light during his confirmation hearing. 
However, going back to the supermajorities, some examples include, Antonin Scalia who 
received a Senate vote margin of 98-0 and Justice O'Connor, who received a vote margin of 99-
0.130 Another example is Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was nominated in 1993 and received a vote 
margin of 96-3.131 Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the last justice to receive a vote exceeding 90. In 
1994 Justice Breyer received a vote of 87-9.132 Since then, no justice nominees have received a 
vote margin that high. For instance, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed with a vote of 78-22.133 
Justice Alito was confirmed with a vote margin of 58-42.134 In the Obama Presidency, votes 
climbed slightly with Justice Sotomayor getting a 68-31 vote and Justice Kagan receiving a 63-
37 vote.135 However, President Trump's nominees saw a drop with Justice Gorsuch receiving a 
54-45 vote total, and Justice Kavanaugh only getting a 50-48 confirmation vote.136 It is also 
worth noting that in 2016 Republican Senators refused to bring President Obama's nominee to a 
vote following the passing of Justice Scalia. This action set up the opportunity for President 
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Trump to nominate his first justice to the Court. During this confirmation process, Democrats 
who were frustrated with Republican refusal to bring President Obama's nomination to a vote 
promised a showdown for confirmation.137 This proved to be the case as the Senate had to 
change the rules to have Neil Gorsuch confirmed. Another embittered battle ensued when Justice 
Kennedy retired, and President Trump again had the chance to nominate a justice. The second 
nomination concerned Democrats more than the first, as this nomination would likely tip the 
Court for a long time. The reason the Court would tip was that Justice Kennedy though more 
conservative would often serve as a swing vote on liberal-leaning cases. This battle was long as 
allegations surfaced of wrongdoing by the future Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Which ultimately 
stalled the confirmation process. Conservatives believed that the accusations were an attempt by 
the liberal faction to stop the nomination process. These factors demonstrate a polarized 
nomination and confirmation process. Looking at this data, political polarization has had a 
significant impact on the Supreme Court's nomination and confirmation process. This polarized 
process begs the question, does the polarization of the nomination process create polarization on 
the bench? 
Unanimous decision v. 1-vote Split 
Setting up the Study 
 As the information has shown so far, polarization has had an impact on the nomination 
and confirmation process of Supreme Court justices. This indicates that polarization has some 
degree of impact on the Court. What needs to be addressed is if polarization has had any impact 
on the decisions of the Court. To determine this, the Supreme Court database was used to get 
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information about the cases classified into liberal or conservative rulings. The cases of interest 
were cases from 1970-2017, split into two distinct year groups, one group being 1970-1993, and 
the second group is 1994-2017. Within each year group, every year was looked at, to find the 
number of unanimous decisions for the Court. This included 5-0 up to 9-0 decisions as the 
justices do not always participate in every decision. Next, the amount of 1-vote margin cases was 
looked up, which included 5-4 and 4-3 decisions. They then got divided by the total number of 
cases heard that year. Which provided a percentage of unanimous and 1-vote margin cases.  
The Data 
 In the year group of 1970-1993, the Supreme Court rendered judgment on 3,631 cases, 
which fell into one of the two political ideologies. Of these cases, the Court ruled unanimously 
on 39.5% of them. They also had 17.03% of their cases come down to a one-vote margin. In the 
1994-2017 year group, the Court heard 1,943 cases, and 45.73% of cases were decided 
unanimously, while 19.64% of the cases came down to a 1-vote margin. As it can be observed, 
the average of unanimous cases rose by 6.23%, and the amount of 1-vote margin cases rose by 
2.61%.  
The Analysis 
 Taking this data at face value, both categories rose on average. Some scholars look at this 
data and see this as a growing partisan divide within the Court. These scholars argue that the rise 
in 1-vote margin cases shows a correlation of political polarization. They argue this by 
addressing the 1-vote margin category, stating that it is a result of the Court deciding on high-
salience political issues, which results in a polarized divide.138  However, despite this argument, 
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the rise in unanimous cases was still 3.62% higher than those with 1-vote margins, which would 
indicate that the Court may be coming closer together.  
Conservative v. Liberal Decisions 
Setting up the Study 
 Much like the first study, the cases of interest were cases from 1970-2017, split into two 
distinct year groups, one group being 1970-1993, and the second group is 1994-2017. 
Furthermore, for each year in the group, the justices who sat on the bench were identified. Once 
the justices were identified, the Martin-Quinn score was then assigned. For this study, the single 
year group Martin-Quinn (MQ) scores were not used, but instead, the scores were averaged out 
over the lifetime of the judge. The reason for this was to determine which direction they lean 
overall. If the scores were taken on each year, it could skew the data as the score is affected by 
the way that the justice voted each year. This would have the possibility of turning "liberal" 
justices conservative and vice-versa. Once each justice was assigned their average MQ score, the 
focus turned to the percentage of times that the justice voted conservatively or liberally. The 
average of these was taken to get a total lifetime voting percentage. As some justices served 
before 1970 or in both year groups, their voting averages were also averaged from the start of a 
year group (or when they started their tenure) to the end of the year group. This information was 
then compared to the averages of the Supreme Court decision percentages. Finally, the averages 




 The following table illustrates the data found about the justices and their voting behavior. 
Figure 1 
To provide a better understanding of the graph, the following details will be provided: In the 
Justice column, there are the MQ scores of each justice. If the score is positive, it means the 
justice is likely to vote more conservatively; if the score is negative, the justice is likely to vote 
more liberally. Also, in the justice column, the average vote of the Court for each justice during 
their tenure is provided. In the next section, the lifetime voting percentages of each justice is 
seen. In the third section, the percentage of times that each justice voted conservative within their 
time in the year group is presented. The final section will be the topic of discussion, which is the 
difference between each justice's voting percentage and the average of the Court. In this graph, 
the differences are calculated using the average of conservative voting. If the number is negative, 
it indicates that they voted more liberally. As this graph indicates, despite the political leaning 
score of justices, many of the justices voted closely with the overall average of the decisions. If 
they were not closely aligned with the decisions, there does not seem to be an immediate 
correlation between political score and voting difference. This can be seen with Justice Douglas, 
who had a high lifetime voting record of liberal voting but was found during his tenure in his 
Justices Life Time Conservative % Life Time Liberal % 1970-1993 C% 1970-1993 L% 1994-2017 C% 1994-2017 L% Diff Vote/Decision 1970-1993 Diff Vote/Decision 1994-2017
Douglas /-4.15/51.33C 41.88% 58.12% 54.47% 45.53% 2.73
Black/-1.76/51.8C 38.74% 61.26% 51.82% 48.18% 0.02
Harlan/1.64/51.8C 34.27% 65.73% 48.98% 51.02% -2.82
Stewart/.563/54.26C 44.18% 55.82% 54.82% 45.18% 0.56
White/.44/54.72C 48.64% 51.36% 54.65% 45.35% -0.06
Marshall/-2.83/54.85C 53.06% 46.94% 55.35% 44.62% 0.5
Burger/1.83/55.24C 55.90% 44.10% 56.36% 43.36% 1.12
Blackmun/-.116/54.79C 55.31% 44.69% 55.14% 44.86% 0.35
Brennan /-1.94/55.11C 46.49% 53.51% 55.90% 44.10% 0.79
Powell/.993/55.37C 57.86% 42.14% 56.75% 43.25% 1.02
Rehnquist/2.86*/54.92C/56.69C 56.66% 43.34% 55.66% 44.34% 56.95% 43.05% 0.74 0.26
Stevens/-1.5*/55.7C/56.37C 56.16% 43.84% 55.28% 44.72% 55.80% 44.20% -0.42 -0.57
O'Connor/.896*/55.24C/56.91C 56.05% 43.95% 55.16% 44.84% 56.52% 43.48% -0.08 -0.39
Scalia/2.476*/53.89C/54.70C 54.73% 45.27% 53.94% 46.06% 54.73% 45.27% 0.04 0.03
Kennedy/.67*/53.9C/54.31C 54.23% 45.77% 52.03% 47.97% 54.30% 45.70% -1.87 -0.01
Souter/-.803*/53.19C/56.79C 54.79% 45.21% 53.88% 46.12% 54.50% 44.50% 0.69 -2.29
Thomas/3.476*/54.39C/54.31C 53.64% 46.36% 53.45% 46.55% 53.10% 46.90% -0.94 -1.21
Ginsburg/-1.728*/56.38/54.31C 54.30% 45.70% 56.38% 43.62% 53.73% 46.27% 0 -0.58
Breyer/-1.204/54.31C 54.22% 45.78% 51.58% 48.42% -2.73
Roberts/1.174/52.29C 53.02% 46.98% 53.02% 46.98% 0.73
Alito/1.744/51.70C 53.16% 46.84% 52.63% 47.37% 0.93
Sotomayor/-2.535/50.16C 50.25% 49.75% 49.89% 50.11% -0.28
Kagan/-1.631/50.18C 49.81% 50.19% 50.78% 49.22% 0.59
Gorsuch/1.232/50.04C 52.94% 47.06% 59.79% 40.21% 9.39
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year group to have voted 2.73% higher than the Court conservative voting. This is also evident 
with Justice Ginsberg, who is well known as one of the more liberal justices, but she voted in 
line with the Court in the 1970-1993 year group and .58% more conservative than the average of 
Court rulings in the 1994-2017 year group. Though both year groups remain close to the center, 
one thing is that the 1994-2017 group had a slightly higher difference than the 1970-1993 year 
group. Which does indicate a potential drift toward polarization. However, it is worth noting that 
despite political ideology score, many of these justice's votes were closely aligned with one 
another. In fact, some of the liberal justices are found to have a higher conservative record than 
some conservative justices and vice-versa. The final dataset is the average voting percentage of 
the 1970-1993 year group and the 1994-2017 year group. This data is compared with the 
ideological makeup of the Court. Except for 1970, the Court was made up of 33% conservative, 
33% liberal, and 33% moderate in the 1970-1993 year group. Note that the moderate 
determination was made for this study based on an MQ score below .6 in either direction. In the 
1970-1993 year group, the Court ruled conservatively, on average 54.79% of the time, while 
ruling liberally 45.21% of the time. In the 1994-2017 year group, the Court was made up of 56% 
conservative justices and 44% liberal justices. During this time frame, the justices ruled 
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The Analysis  
 The data presented above look at the justices' ideology score and look at the justices' 
voting record. The idea is that if the political polarization impacts the Court, the expectation is 
that as polarization increased, the ideology scores would have more bearing on how the justices 
were likely to vote. As noted above, when the voting records of the justices were averaged out 
and then subtracted from the average of the Court rulings, they were assigned a difference 
percentage. The expectation is that as polarization continued to increase, the differences would 
also increase specifically within the ideological spectrum that each justice is supposed to fall in. 
Which did not happen, as some liberal justices had a higher conservative voting record than the 
Year Voting Voting Year Voting2 Voting3
1970 51.80% 48.20% 1994 59.55% 40.45%
1971 45.09% 54.91% 1995 54.55% 45.45%
1972 53.93% 46.07% 1996 63.54% 36.46%
1973 56.14% 43.86% 1997 59.79% 40.21%
1974 49.67% 50.33% 1998 64.04% 35.96%
1975 62.22% 37.78% 1999 50.00% 50.00%
1976 59.77% 40.23% 2000 49.41% 50.59%
1977 50% 50% 2001 60.24% 39.76%
1978 60.51% 39.49% 2002 59.26% 40.74%
1979 48.68% 51.32% 2003 57.69% 42.31%
1980 59.03% 40.97% 2004 45.57% 54.43%
1981 53.22% 46.78% 2005 59.30% 40.70%
1982 56.79% 43.21% 2006 58.67% 41.33%
1983 61.90% 38.10% 2007 48.57% 51.43%
1984 55.84% 44.16% 2008 61.73% 38.27%
1985 59.26% 40.74% 2009 50.00% 50.00%
1986 53.80% 46.20% 2010 56.25% 43.75%
1987 51.37% 48.63% 2011 56.58% 43.42%
1988 59.18% 40.82% 2012 50.63% 49.37%
1989 54.01% 45.99% 2013 44.59% 55.41%
1990 49.59% 50.41% 2014 42.03% 57.97%
1991 53.33% 46.67% 2015 51.32% 48.68%
1992 53.45% 46.55% 2016 47.83% 52.17%
1993 56.38% 43.62% 2017 52.24% 47.76%
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average Court ruling. The reverse of this occurred for some of the conservative justices on the 
bench. This indicates that despite the perception of polarization, it cannot immediately be 
attributed to the justices' understood leanings. The final piece of data that should indicate a 
polarization on the bench is comparing the two-year group's overall voting percentage. If the 
Court were polarized, conservative rulings would increase overall as the Court had a consistent 
5-4 split along the conservative lines during the 1994-2017 year group. However, after getting 
the average, the opposite occurred, as the average conservative ruling dropped by .48%. This 
would indicate that the rulings are starting to come closer to the center.  
 The polarization of the Court can have severe implications on how citizens view the 
Court. As it has already been stated, if the United States citizens view the Court as another 
political organization, the Court will begin to lose legitimacy. As the data above indicates, 
currently, it does not appear that the Court is becoming increasingly polarized. However, looking 
at the data provided above, some justices appear to be more polarized than their predecessors. 
Three worth noting are Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Gorsuch. More details will 
have to emerge for Justice Gorsuch as the data only looks at his first two terms. However, Justice 
Sotomayor had nine years on the bench for the data. She voted almost consistently along her 
ideological lines and had a lower rate of agreeance with the Court than the other justices. Despite 
this, the Court still has not drifted toward polarization. More studies will need to be done to 
determine if the Court will continue to see a shift along ideological lines. One thing that may 
prevent this from happening is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Roberts has 
said that it is not the Courts responsibility to make law but rather interpret it. This next section 
will explore his role as Chief Justice to preserve the Court's legitimacy.  
Chief Justice and Legitimacy 
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 As accusations against the current Court continue to circulate, Chief Justice Roberts has 
taken many steps to demonstrate to the public his desire to maintain an independent judiciary 
free from partisan politics. In his end of the year report in 2019, he stated, “I ask my judicial 
colleagues to continue their efforts to promote public confidence in the judiciary, both through 
their rulings and through civic outreach.”139 He then states, “We should reflect on our duty to 
judge without fear or favor, deciding each mater with humility, integrity, and dispatch.”140 This 
is not the first time the Chief Justice Roberts has commented on the need for an independent 
judiciary who must maintain public trust. He understands that the Court must maintain public 
support if they are to maintain the legitimacy that is required for citizens to follow unpopular 
decisions. Therefore, he has tried, especially in the most recent session, to appear as non-partisan 
as possible. This section will look at his recent cases he has been the deciding vote on and will 
also include some of his comments regarding those cases.  
June Medical Services v. Russo 
 On June 29, 2020, the case of June Medical Services v. Russo was decided by a narrow 5-
4 split decision. This case was in response to a Louisiana law requiring abortion doctors to have 
admitting privileges at a hospital.141 In this case, Chief Justice Roberts sided with the four liberal 
justices and struck down the law. This law was like a Texas law that was struck down in 2016 by 
the Supreme Court by a 5-4 split. However, in 2016 Chief Justice Roberts sided with the 
minority justices and found the law to be within the constitutional limits. For the June Medical 
Services v. Russo case, Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion and cited the same reasons 
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as he had in 2016. Although Chief Justice Roberts sided with the four liberal justices, he did not 
concur with their opinion and instead wrote his own. In his opinion, he stated that he felt that a 
similar case in 2016 had been wrongly decided. However, it was the responsibility of the Court 
to uphold the legal doctrine of stare decisis, which requires them, absent exceptional 
circumstances, to treat the cases alike. In this first case, Chief Justice Roberts demonstrates 
judicial restraint and tries to uphold the Court's tradition. This appears to demonstrate a clear and 
defined attempt to act in good faith toward the public and prove that the Court is not just another 
political entity. If he were acting along partisan lines, it would likely have resulted in the Court 
overturning previously decided precedent.  
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California 
 On June 18, 2020, the case of the Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the 
University of California was decided on a 5-4 split court margin. Again, like the abortion case, 
Chief Justice Roberts sided with the four liberal justices. However, this time he did not write a 
separate opinion but instead wrote the primary opinion. This case was in response to President 
Trump's administration, removing the protections outlined in the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals. In Chief Justice Robert's opinion, he stated that the matter was not if the DHS had the 
authority to rescind the act, because they did, but it was a matter of how they did it.142 From the 
vantage point of the average citizen, this would appear to be a victory for the left-leaning 
population. However, as his opinion demonstrates, it is merely delaying the action from 
occurring and would require the DHS to attempt to rescind DACA again. This was a very 
strategic move on behalf of Chief Justice Roberts because it does not necessarily rule against the 
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president, but it does not favor him either. This helps shore up the idea that the Court is not 
acting politically. As the introduction to this chapter showed, many have questioned the 
legitimacy of the Court, especially the liberal population, because it has a conservative majority. 
Through the current actions of Chief Justice Roberts, he is trying to demonstrate that the Court 
can still operate in a non-partisan manner. What needs to be addressed is if the public will view 
this as an intentional strategy or see it as a genuine attempt to preserve non-partisan judicial 
behavior.  
 These two cases are only a few of the cases that Chief Justice Roberts has sided with the 
liberal justices. With many liberals calling his Court into question, his steps have been calculated 
to maintain the legitimacy of the Court. These two cases were important cases to the political 
left. Because they were important, and the left has continuously threatened the legitimacy of the 
Court, Chief Justice Roberts has been meticulous about how he has worked his opinions showing 
that he is willing to uphold previous Court decisions while also trying to preserve his standing 
with the right by stating his disagreement with the decisions. In September of 2019, Chief Justice 
Roberts discussed the concept of upholding the previous precedent. He stated,  
I also think of humility in terms of humility to the past. There is no reason to suppose that 
I and my eight colleagues are any better at decerning the meaning of the Constitution 
than members of the Court that went before us. Therefore, we begin with respect and 
humility towards precedent that has been established by those prior judges and depart 
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from that precedent only in the most significant cases, and for the most significant 
reasons.143 
 This quote came from an article written before the decisions rendered in June of 2020. This 
demonstrates that he holds previous precedent in high regard and will not overrule it unless 
necessary. This action will only show the public that Chief Justice Roberts intends to reside over 
a non-partisan Court.  
Congressional/Presidential Relationship 
 Much of this chapter has focused on public opinion and how it impacts legitimacy. 
However, this is only one part of how the Court maintains legitimacy. As Federalist No. 78 
points out, the Court does not have the power of the purse or the sword. Therefore, they cannot 
enforce their decisions. This means that to maintain legitimacy, they must have presidential and 
Congressional support. In the last section, two cases were discussed in which Chief Justice 
Roberts sided with the four liberal justices. This decision may have positive impacts on how the 
liberal public views the Court, but it could have damaging effects on how Congress and the 
president view the Court. This is not the only time that the Court has faced objections from the 
sitting president or Congress. This section will discuss several examples of presidential attempts 
to undermine the Court as well as negative comments from legislators.  
 With the recent decisions, Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues on the left have faced 
much criticism from the conservative members of Congress. One such example came after the 
ruling on DACA. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas stated, “Over recent years, more and more, Chief 
 





Justice Roberts has been playing games with the court to achieve the policy outcomes he 
desires.”144 President Donald Trump joined in tweeting, “The recent Supreme Court decisions, 
not only on DACA, Sanctuary Cities, Census, and others, tell you only one thing, we need new 
justices”145 These types of statements from lawmakers and the president can do severe damage to 
the legitimacy of the Court. The main reason is that Congress and the president are the ones who 
will implement and enforce the Courts decisions. Despite the rebukes from the president and 
other conservative policymakers, Chief Justice Roberts's actions may have warded off any new 
attempts to stack the Court. This is far more important because packing a Court would demolish 
the legitimacy of the Court as it would weaken its current power. Court-packing is a real 
possibility; ever since Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed to the bench, liberal politicians have 
made several calls to attempt to pack the Court.146   
The rebukes from the conservative faction are not the only examples of the Court facing 
challenges from the president and Congress. In March of 2020, Chief Justice Roberts had to 
rebuke Senator Schumer when he stated that Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch “won't 
know what hit them if they vote to uphold abortion restrictions.”147 He went on further to say, “I 
want to tell you, Gorsuch, I want to tell you, Kavanaugh, you have released the whirlwind, and 
you will pay the price.”148 This comment demonstrates that policymakers have little concern 
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about chastising the Court, but these actions can undermine the judicial institution. Like the 
comments, the idea of Court-packing has also occurred in the past. In 1937 President Roosevelt 
attempted to pack the Court to push forward with his New Deal measures.149 However, some 
justices saw this and switched their stance on specific items and regained confidence from the 
public. This action prevented the Court from losing legitimacy.150 As the above examples 
demonstrate, regardless of how the Court acts, if the decisions are not in line with the ideological 
beliefs of the politicians in power, the Court may be challenged. This means that the Court is 
always having to act to maintain legitimacy. This is dangerous because it could possibly 
jeopardize true constitutional principles. 
Conclusion 
 The power of the Court relies heavily on public opinion to maintain legitimacy. If the 
public is unwilling to follow the decisions of the Court, their decisions will become meaningless. 
Therefore, the Court must maintain a persona as a non-partisan entity. As the data suggested, the 
Court has not fallen victim to actual partisan behaviors at this time, but there are a few justices 
that seem to be trending toward that area. Currently, it seems that it is up to Chief Justice Roberts 
to act as the swing vote to ensure that the Court maintains the view of legitimacy. This could also 
hold off calls for Court-packing. The downside to this approach is that it does risk the chance of 
losing presidential support. This could result in the president's decision to ignore the Court and 
go the way of Andrew Jackson, who is credited with saying, "Chief Justice Marshall has made 
his decision, now let him enforce it." At this time, it does not appear that the president is going to 
ignore the rulings, but that remains to be seen. Although this study provides a comprehensive 
 




review of the Court and looks at polarization, additional studies need to be done. Specifically, 
updates with additional rulings with the two new conservative justices need to be included. 
Additionally, some of the more volatile cases may need to be reviewed to add context to the 
polarization discussion. Despite these shortcomings, this study does provide enough detail to 


















“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in 
a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its 
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it 
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”151 These are the words written by Alexander 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 when the founders were trying to convince the states to adopt the 
United States' new Constitution. This paper has explored this idea of the "least dangerous 
branch" and has considered many different aspects of the argument. It was determined that for 
the judicial branch to be "powerful," it must meet specific criteria. The first factor was that its 
power for judicial review had to be valid. That is, it needed to be a constitutional power that was 
granted and not merely a power provided to itself. The second factor that needed to be attained 
was that it had to possess judicial supremacy. What this means is that the Court had to be the 
final say on the matter. The third factor was that it had to maintain legitimacy so that its rulings 
would be followed. Throughout this paper, the objective was to demonstrate that despite the 
perception of an increasingly powerful Court, it is still, in fact, the least dangerous branch. 
Despite having specific criteria that have been met, the main idea is that it still does not have the 
power of the purse or the power of the sword. Because they do not possess that power, they 
ultimately cannot enforce their rulings.  
 The process to get to this conclusion was through a series of chapters aimed at analyzing 
the three factors to determine if the Court met requirements. The first requirement was the power 
of judicial review. In this chapter, the conclusion was that the Court did possess the power of 
 
151 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 78”  
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judicial review. This was based on the studies done on the Constitutional text and the Federalist 
and Anti-Federalist papers. Using the Constitution's text to discuss the power of the judiciary to 
have jurisdiction of all laws subject to the Constitution, and then using the supremacy clause as 
the Constitution being the supreme law of the land, it would imply that the founders intended the 
Court to have the power.  
Furthermore, when Federalist No. 78 was reviewed, it explicitly said that the judiciary 
would have the power to void laws contrary to the Constitution. Finally, cases from the pre-
constitutional era were analyzed, and they demonstrated an apparent use of judicial review. If 
one were to look at standard practices at the time of the founding, it is reasonable to assume that 
most people would have accepted that it was the judiciary's role to interpret and strike down 
laws. Especially since this was common practice amongst several states at the time that the 
Constitution was ratified. Given the conclusion drawn on the chapter, this achieved the first 
factor the Court needed even to have the consideration that they have grown in power.  
 The next factor that was explored in this paper is if the Court possessed judicial 
supremacy. In this chapter, the Constitution was again analyzed to see if there was anything in 
there that could indicate that the Court was to be the final say. When the Constitution was 
analyzed, there were some indicators that the Court may have judicial supremacy. Specifically, 
Article III states that judicial power should be vested in one Supreme Court. This section 
indicates that the power is vested in the Court. Then in Article VI, it states that the Constitution 
is the supreme law of the land. This would allude to the Court possessing the ultimate authority. 
However, as the chapter indicated, the Constitution states that Congress and the president also 
have a role in the execution of the Constitution. This leaves the idea of supremacy up in the air. 
The same was true when Federalist No. 78 was analyzed because, in Federalist No. 78, it implies 
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that the judiciary still relied on the other branches to implement their decisions. This alone would 
indicate that supremacy may not exist. A similar thing was found in Federalist No. 81, where 
Hamilton again acknowledges that the Court may have the final say. However, he then goes back 
and states that it may only apply to that case, and Congress could pass a new law or amendment 
to override the Court. These all provided examples of how the Court could possess supremacy, 
but it was contingent on the other branches' willingness to follow the Court. What this means is 
that this alone proves that the Court is still the least dangerous branch. However, to determine 
how much power the Court possessed, it was still essential to determine how the Court maintains 
legitimacy and if it was still a legitimate institution.  
 The third factor the Court had to possess to be considered powerful was legitimacy. The 
idea is that if the public views the Court as an illegitimate institution, the public will be less 
likely to follow their decisions, especially those deemed unpopular. In this chapter, the argument 
was that for the Court to maintain legitimacy, the public still needed to view it as a non-partisan 
body. The Supreme Court's actions were analyzed from 1970-2017 to prove that the court was 
operating in a non-partisan manner. The Court's actions were broken up into two separate year 
groups, one acting as the control and the other being the test group. The two groups were based 
on research that showed a rapid increase in the United States polarization starting around 1994. 
Therefore, the groups were broken up into the 1970-1993 group and the 1994-2017 group. When 
the data was carefully analyzed, it was determined that there was no clear indication of 
polarization. However, it also showed that there could be increased polarization as time went on. 
Another factor that was assessed was the role of Chief Justice Roberts operating as a swing vote. 
The purpose behind this action was so that the Chief Justice could maintain the appearance of a 
non-partisan Court. The final factor that was explored was the relationship between the president 
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and Congress with the Court. This section demonstrated just how sensitive the legitimacy of the 
Court could be. Congress and the president can undermine the Court with a few simple words or 
fail to implement the Court's policy, which could also undermine their legitimacy.  
 With all these factors considered, no other conclusion can be drawn except that the Court 
is still the least dangerous branch. As it has been proven, the Court still cannot enforce their 
rulings. Currently, the Court still must prove itself as a non-partisan organization just to maintain 
any degree of legitimacy. At the same time, Congress and the president can act in almost any 
fashion and still have legitimacy in their actions. Furthermore, it only takes one time for the 
president to ignore the Court to unravel their legitimacy. If the Court were truly more powerful 
than intended, they would not worry about trying to be non-partisan. If that were the case, there 
should be more rulings in favor of conservative policies and more split decisions. However, that 
has not occurred, and it shows that the Court is still the least dangerous branch.  
 This paper explored many different factors of the Court to come to this conclusion. 
However, additional studies may need to be accomplished in the future, especially in the realm 
of polarization. During this study, it appeared that a few justices were beginning to rule more in 
line with their political ideology. To see if this trend continues, future scholars would need to 
look at the modern justices and determine if they continued the trend of political ideology 
impacting their rulings. Furthermore, studies would need to be conducted into specific cases 
along the ideological lines. These additional studies could provide more context into the 
polarization topic. Specific areas that should be studied are the ramifications of Chief Justice 
Roberts actions acting as a swing justice. Specifically, it may be important to see if his actions 
have resulted in the conservative faction viewing the Court in a lesser light. Another important 
area that may need further study is to see what happens if a conservative ends up nominating the 
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replacement for Justice Ginsberg. At this point, many liberal politicians say that they would work 
to increase the justices if Justice Ginsberg is replaced by a conservative. Another thing that may 
need to be done is a deeper dive into the use of judicial review, as this paper only scratched the 
surface. Though this paper determined that judicial review is constitutional, it may be beneficial 
to see if the judicial review that exists today was the review intended by the founders. Another 
area that may need some focus is how the lower courts impact the view of the judiciary. Even 
though they are not Supreme, they impact change more than the high Court because they hear far 
more cases. The actions of the lower courts could impact the way people view the judiciary. 
Finally, it may be beneficial to explore more on judicial supremacy by analyzing several cases 
throughout history. If future scholars could look at every ruling that the Court has made and look 
at the micro-level (how cities and states follow the rulings), it may provide better insight into the 
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